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Corporations are increasingly important actors in international aw.
But vital questions underlying this development have long gone
unanswered: How and why do corporations commit to international aw?
This article constructs a general account of business interaction with
international egal obligation and suggests that a gateway to demystifying
this persistent puzzle lies in corporate opinio juris.
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Corporate opinio juris describes a company's subscription to a rule of
international law, even though the company is not technically bound by that
rule. This subscription functions as a kind of pledge that, once made, has
sway over the company and its peers and symbiotically enhances the
authority of international law. Corporate opinio juris provides a common
rubric to analyze the subfields of international law where these corporate
pledges have been documented, serving as a paradigm to better understand
how and why companies adhere to international aw.
The article then unpacks how various structures within business law
and management theory help to predict the formation of corporate
commitments to international law, arguing that corporate opinio juris holds
potentially sweeping implications for international law generally.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even before President Trump announced America's with-
drawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) and de-
spite his earlier threat to cancel funding to that global institu-
tion, American pharmaceutical companies had begun coordi-
nating vaccine trial efforts with their counterparts around the
world.1 This cross-border corporate coordination has since
continued under the auspices of the WHO's Access to Covid-
19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator Hub.
2 Furthermore, when asked if
his company would participate in a global vaccine deployment
mechanism, the CEO of American pharmaceutical giant, Pfi-
zer, replied "Absolutely. And we are already a part of these
discussions."3
1. World Health Org. [WHO], Draft Landscape of COVID-19 Candidate
Vaccines (July 15, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/draft-
landscape-of-covid-19-candidate-vaccines [https://perma.cc/6LZP-XLVH];
WHO, Public Statement for Collaboration on COVD-19 Vaccine Development (Apr.
13, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/13-04-2020-public-state
ment-for-collaboration-on-covid-19-vaccine-development [https://perma.cc/
C3JC-Y2TM]. See also Gabrielle Debinski et al., The Graphic Truth: Competing
and Cooperating on a COVD-19 Vaccine, GZERO (June 14, 2020), https://
www.gzeromedia.com/ the-graphic-truth-competing-and-cooperating-on-a-
covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/DZ39-V2KR] (noting that there is "a lot
of international collaboration going on behind the scenes" in the race to
develop a vaccine for COVID-19).




3. Int'l Fed'n of Pharm. Mfrs. & Ass'ns (IFPMA), Global Biopharma CEO/
Top Executives COVJD-19 Media Briefing, YoUTUBE (May 28, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwMMwDshedO [https://perma.cc/MT94-
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Pfizer's CEO also admitted his fear that vaccine compa-
nies "will be caught in the middle" of a struggle over distribu-
tion between the WHO and "every national government [that]
would like to get the vaccine for them."4 However, in language
indicating a commitment to a form of sovereign equality, he
pledged that "everybody will get a fair share of the supplies
that exist as quickly as possible and . . . we will not forget the
underprivileged countries that likely commercially [ ] play
very little role if any but from the human perspective they have
equal rights."5
Skeptics may posit that such easy words will become empty
if companies must sacrifice profits to adhere to international
institutional decisions. However, in reference to Johnson &
Johnson's March 2020 pledge to not profit from any vaccine
during the pandemic,6 the company's Vice-Chairman and
Chief Scientific Officer was asked whether "the definition of
pandemic period for which vaccines will be supplied on a non-
profit basis" corresponds to when the WHO announces the
end of the public health emergency of international concern.
He replied, "Yeah, that's the assumption . .. certain countries
might declare it sooner over, but that is not an established def-
inition yet ... the pandemic will be over when the WHO de-
clares it over."7
G333] (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Biopharma CEO Brief-
ing].
4. Id. This fear of governments hoarding vaccines seems to have been
realized with alleged Russian state-sponsored attempts to hack the data of
various companies currently pursuing a vaccine. Chris Fox & Leo Kelion,
Coronavirus: Russian Spies Target Covid-19 Vaccine Research, BBC (July 16,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53429506 [https://
perma.cc/8BDJ-FT4R].
5. Biopharma CEO Briefing, supra note 3.
6. Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Announces a
Lead Vaccine Candidate for COVID-19; Landmark New Partnership with
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services; and Commitment to Supply




for-emergency-pandemic-use [https://perma.cc/8KF7-7E7B] ("The Com-
pany plans to begin production at risk imminently and is committed to
bringing an affordable vaccine to the public on a not-for-profit basis for
emergency pandemic use.").
7. Biopharma CEO Briefing, supra note 3.
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As such, despite President Trump's rejection of the
WHO's interpretation of international law and global public
health, these American pharmaceutical companies have
adopted and endorsed the WHO position as the basis for their
cooperation and profit policies. Johnson & Johnson would not
have promised to place its potential to profit from any vaccine
in the hands of the WHO.
This apparent corporate deference to the WHO is a devel-
opment so far overlooked. A recent essay describing "the col-
lapse of global cooperation" surrounding international efforts
to combat COVID-19 focused almost solely on states and men-
tioned as an aside that "[s]ince the WHO is not legally man-
dated to govern or listen to nonstate actors, its coordinating
role is hindered."8 But that proposition is correct only if one
believes coordination can be achieved solely through com-
mand. Instead, coordination may also come through subscrip-
tion. The focus on states has thus created a longstanding blind
spot regarding the active participation of business in the struc-
tures and processes of international law.
More generally, the sort of corporate commitment to in-
ternational law evinced above and examined in this article un-
dermines the validity of the realist critique of international law
as an empty vessel, an existential threat to international law
itself. Realist scholars of international law have long argued
that international law is little more than an attractive cover for
state self-interest and that when this diverges from the conduct
international law demands, states will choose their own advan-
tage and break the law.9 However, if corporations,
10 actors not
explicitly bound by international law and whose sole mission is
often conceptualized as the self-interested generation of
profit, are subscribing to and deploying international law to
8. Allyn L. Taylor & Roojin Habibi, The Collapse of Global Cooperation
Under the WHO International Health Regulations at the Outset of COVID-1 9: Sculpt-





9. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 39-40 (2006).
10. This Article uses "corporations" as a shorthand for all for-profit busi-
ness entities, mirroring the general use of the term in international law
scholarship.
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orient their decisions and measure the validity of decisions of
the state, this might well indicate that international law has
more force and obligatory power than realists believe.
Indeed, in response to assertions of the primacy of states
in affirming or eroding the authority of international institu-
tions, one might rightly ask which is more important to the
WHO's influence over the international response to COVID-
19: rebellion by a state actor or commitments by companies
like Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson, which might soon have
control over the actual vaccines?
Corporations embracing international law notwithstand-
ing their home states' attitude to the global legal system and
regardless of the inability of international institutions to com-
mand businesses' adherence is not a phenomenon limited to
the sphere of public health." Nor is it just a reaction to the
present petulance of a particular administration or merely a
manifestation of the crisis thinking of the current pandemic.
Instead, companies are crafting their own system of public
value-signaling and commitments based on the precepts and
rules of international law in countless contexts, from the envi-
ronment, human rights, and immigration, to the law of occu-
pation and territorial sovereignty and data protection and pri-
vacy.
This praxis raises many significant questions that bridge
the fields of corporate law and international law, but the ques-
tions at the heart of this article are how and why corporations
commit to international law.
A gateway to understanding the processes and outcomes
of such commitment is corporate opinio juris.12 According to
the standard definition of customary international law, custom
11. See Jay Butler, The Corporate Keepers of International Law, 114 AM. J.
INT'L L. 189, 189 (2020) ("In transborder environmental protection, territo-
rial disputes, internet governance, anticorruption, international human
rights, and humanitarian law, private business are increasingly supporting
the implementation and enforcement of international law.").
12. This is not the first use of the term corporate opinio juris, but the
one article to previously deploy the term did so to denote the generality of
company behavior in relation to a voluntary code or international legal doc-
ument, rather than as a basis for elucidating individual company discern-
ment. Kirsten Stefanik, Rise of the Corporation and Corporate Social Responsibility:
The Case for Corporate Customary International Law, 54 C AN. Y.B. INT'L L. 276,
289, 301 (2017).
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is determined through the aggregation of state practice and
opinio juris: a state's declaration affirming its belief in the
mandatory quality of the particular act or practice in ques-
tion.13 Generally speaking, in order for a new rule of custom
to come into being, it must be supported or evidenced by
widespread practice undertaken because of a stated belief of
legal obligation. Without opinio juris, the practice is merely
pattern, much like social courtesy or politesse. Statements are
often treated as sufficient evidence of opinio juris. Thus, as
Anthea Roberts explains in her oft-cited treatment of custom-
ary law, "[o]pinio juris concerns statements of belief rather
than actual beliefs."14 It is not for outside observers or jurists
to unpack whether a state meant what it said when it declared
its sense of obligation toward a particular practice.
Corporate opinio juris takes the principle of opinio juris
ordinarily applicable to states and deploys it to describe a com-
pany's acknowledgement hat a particular activity is required
by international law. By adapting its behavior in this way and
announcing this rationale, the company seeks to follow inter-
national law, even if it is not explicitly bound by it. This article
does not argue that corporate opinio juris generates binding
legal obligations in the same way that customary international
law functions with respect to states. Instead, the process and
outcome of corporate pledges serve both to associate the com-
pany with a standard against which others may measure and
critique the company's subsequent actions and to communi-
cate a new best practice based on international law that peer
entities may be drawn to follow.15 Additionally, the company's
13. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 1 27
(June 3) ("It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary interna-
tional law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris
of States . . .. ")
14. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Cus-
tomary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757-58
(2012).
15. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for
Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 776, 818 (2007)
(arguing in favor of "debunk[ing] the notion that corporate rhetoric has no
connection to actual practices," demonstrating how rhetoric can encourage
corporate engagement in beneficial behavior, and reframing "corporate
rhetoric" as a form of "corporate commitment").
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pledge may enhance the authority of the international system
to which it is made.16
Corporate opinio juris may be formed through a variable
combination of external pressure from activists, internal pres-
sure from employees or shareholders, internalized commit-
ment from company managers to the international legal sys-
tem, or company leadership decisions that international law
aligns with and will further the company's own interests. Cor-
porate opinio juris leads a company to undertake or refuse a
particular course of action according to a rationale prescribed
by international law. In either instance, a company manifests
its acceptance of international law as providing the appropri-
ate standard for its own conduct.
Corporate opinio juris is the proper term for business ac-
tively engaging with and deferring to international law because
it accounts for situations in which an actor pronounces that it
must or should do a certain thing, even though, by definition,
it is not yet bound or formally obligated by that particular rule.
The term opinio juris derives from traditional understandings
of customary international law;17 it means that a particular ac-
tion is done because the actor believes it is expected by law.
Opinio juris may involve the acceptance of an obligation, but
it may also include a claim of right.18 And, as explored later in
the article, a mix of factors may drive the formation of that
choice.
Although manifested fidelity to international law may in-
volve sacrificing profits in favor of adherence to a rule, corpo-
rate opinio juris does not require it. Commitment to interna-
16. See Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Iegitimacy of
Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INr'L L.
88, 93 (2006) (positing that compliance with a rule of international law may
be an indication of the perceived legitimacy of international law overall or
the international legal system's "pull").
17. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 120 (2018) ("The requirement, as a constituent ele-
ment of customary international law, that the general practice be accepted
as law (opinio juris) means that the practice in question must be undertaken
with a sense of legal right or obligation.").
18. See Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DuKE L.J. 559, 608-09
(2002) (describing President Truman's Proclamations asserting sovereign
rights over the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf that states
quickly accepted as customary and followed with respect to their own mari-
time entitlements).
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tional law need not be demonstrated solely through self-de-
nial; indeed, that requirement does not exist in other areas of
law, nor does it track human behavior. Sometimes people
commit to law because they believe that it will enhance, not
undermine their interests. The field of contract law is based
on exactly that understanding.19 So too is the principle of vol-
untarism or state consent-the idea that a state is not bound
by a rule unless it consents to be bound-that is fundamental
to international law.20 Companies ought not to be treated dif-
ferently from individuals or states in this respect. The fact that
they act in their own self-interest does not diminish their com-
mitment to sustain a legal rule or principle. Nor should we
have to prove that a company acted to uphold law only by fall-
ing on its own sword for the cause of law. A legal system works
best when it effectuates the interests of its participants and al-
lows them to flourish. To expect otherwise is cruel and implic-
itly relies on a flawed conception of law as solely coercive com-
mand.
A better approach to identifying instances of corporate
opinio juris is to analyze situations in which the preferred di-
rections of domestic authorities and international law diverge.
Because corporations are creatures and creations of domestic
law, whenever the international community wishes to regulate
some aspect of corporate behavior globally, it usually does so
through the intermediary of the state.2 1 The state incorporates
that international legal instruction into domestic law, which
then becomes binding on the company. In this usual multistep
setting, it is difficult to decipher whether the company is fol-
19. Indeed, a contract is not legally enforceable unless both parties bene-
fit from the agreement. Consideration, BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
20. E.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 1 269 (June 27) ("[I]n international law
there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State
concerned, by treaty or otherwise ... ."); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),Judgment,
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7) ("International law governs rela-
tions between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States
therefore emanate from their own free will . . .. Restrictions upon the inde-
pendence of States cannot therefore be presumed.").
21. See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 65-69
(2013) (discussing "persuasion" treaties, which "anticipate domestic imple-
mentation through regulation of private actors").
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lowing the international law or the domestic law because the
two are aligned.
However, when the state is recalcitrant or rejects the inter-
national rule and refuses to incorporate it into domestic law
binding on the company, the company's choice to neverthe-
less order its conduct according to the international legal rule
is indicative of its subscription to the international legal system
on that particular point. The company may find a way to abide
by both rules (perhaps if the international regulation
prescribes a stricter standard than the domestic),22 but that
divergence provides an appropriate setting in which to center
the company's choice of the international standard within the
paradigm of corporate opinio juris.
Accordingly, this article foregrounds instances of such di-
vergence in which the company not only adopts a different
standard from that endorsed by the state, but also makes its
objection to the state's approach clear. It highlights instances
when a company has declined a particular line of government
business, refused state incentives to do business in a certain
place, or engaged in other non-cooperative acts with govern-
ment actors because of a determination that working with the
government in such a way would undermine some norm of
international law. In so doing, the article opens a new space in
the scholarly literature unpacking the interface between cor-
porations and international law.
Because international law does not recognize corpora-
tions as formal legal persons,23 debates rarely focus on the
ways in which corporations voluntarily invoke and implement
international law to check state action.24 In international legal
22. For instance, companies automatically comply with many states' stan-
dards after conforming their conduct to satisfy the European Union's strict
rules. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2012).
23. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v.
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 1 38 (Feb. 5) (describing corporations
as "institutions of municipal law"); Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects"
of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARAJ. INT'L L. 1, 6 (2011) (noting the "rela-
tively cautious (and now dated)" approach taken by the U.S. Restatement of
Foreign Relations, which recognized that corporations were not subjects of
international law).
24. It is true that the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is
focused on corporate actions to pursue socially beneficially outcomes, and
that this field is often framed within the paradigm of human rights. How-
ever, while CSR is largely targeted toward reforming the corporation's own
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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discourse, corporations are usually treated as exemplifying the
limitations of municipal law and the necessity of international
law to coordinate a joint solution to address business entities'
bad behavior.2 5 Corporate opinio juris expands this conversa-
tion to consider the various ways that business acts not merely
as subject but also as decisionmaker utilizing the authority and
legitimacy of international law to buttress its policy choices.
This article argues that corporate opinio juris provides a
valuable means through which to understand how, when, and
why companies commit to international law. It constructs a
framework to identify and predict such behavior and provides
tools to decode why companies act in this manner. It draws
from theories of opinio juris relative to state conduct, but cen-
ters these within instances of corporate protest against state
behavior. Importantly, the Article does not emphasize the role
of corporations in upholding international law in order to
activities and minimizing its harmful social effects, the analysis in this article
involves companies reorienting their activities to target perceived govern-
ment wrongdoing. This important distinction raises new legal and policy is-
sues that scholars are just starting to confront. Corporate use of interna-
tional law to check state action has only lately begun to receive attention in
international legal scholarship. See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, A New Tool for Tech
Companies: International Law, LAwFARE (May 30, 2019), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/new-tool-tech-companies-international-law [https://
perma.cc/LFF3-YCQ6] ("In the past two years, a number of companies have
invoked international law justifications to decline to make their products
available to states that, in their view, will use those products to violate inter-
national law."); Butler, supra note 11, at 189-94 (discussing "decisions by
businesses to conform their operations and policies to international law in
the absence of a clear domestic instruction so to do").
25. See Daniel Bethlehem, The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the
International System and the Challenge to International Law, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 9,
20-21 (2014) ("Municipal law remains the mediator of corporate obligations
today, even in respect of corporate conduct internationally."); Carlos M. Vaz-
quez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 930 (2005) (observing that "[i]nternational
law, as it exists today, includes norms that address the conduct of corpora-
tions and other no-state actors, but, with every few exceptions, the norms do
so by imposing an obligation on states to regulate non-state actors."); Steven
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 443, 463 (2001) (noting that "multinational enterprises are them-
selves recognizing the limits of duties on states" to regulate corporations);
Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'v
SYMP. 19, 28-30 (1997) (explaining that it is becoming increasingly difficult
for states to regulate corporations, given their "increasingly cosmopolitan
nature").
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overshadow or excuse the harms and abuses various compa-
nies have perpetrated. Corporations, like states, are frequently
wrongdoers. Further, the claim advanced here is neither quan-
titative (it is not claimed that corporations uphold interna-
tional law more than they disregard it), nor comparative (it is
not claimed that corporations do a better or worse job of en-
forcing international law than other organizations like states,
NGOs, unions, or other social movements). The theory of cor-
porate opinio juris does not require measurement along ei-
ther dimension to serve as a model for the sort of corporate/
international interaction that it encapsulates. Instead, the arti-
cle seeks to make more visible an alternative relationship be-
tween corporations and international law to broaden and nu-
ance understanding in this increasingly important area.
Part II of this article scrutinizes the current state of the
field and articulates what a theory of corporate opinio juris
contributes to the scholarly literature. Part III highlights illus-
trative examples of companies demonstrating fealty to interna-
tional law over domestic legal instruction in the manner that
the theory of corporate opinio juris suggests. Part IV offers a
predictive account of when corporate opinio juris might arise.
Finally, Part V explores various limitations and implications of
corporate opinio juris for the future of international law.
II. THE PuzzLE OF CORPORATE COMMITMENT
A. Corporate Opinio Juris in Theory
Corporate opinio juris captures the phenomenon of a
company announcing that it will follow an international law
prescription. This subscription to international law may mani-
fest in the company taking a particular action or abstaining
from a certain operation or transaction. Each option allows for
the company to put its declared support for international law
into practice, but with a different form of conduct. Usually,
the company manifests this position through a statement de-
claring the obligatory quality of its adherence to the interna-
tional rule or practice in question. But because there is not yet
a formal requirement for countries to follow international law
absent implementing domestic legislation, there is an element
of choice to follow the rule or legal principle in question.
Corporate opinio juris is an application of orthodox
opinio juris that public international law uses to describe state
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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behavior.26 It takes the principle and methodology of opinio
juris used to understand and categorize state conduct and ap-
plies it to the conduct of multinational corporations and the
relationship of this latter set of actors to international law. In
so doing, it offers a way to better understand how an actor may
accept a norm as law before that norm has become law (or,
more precisely, law applicable to that actor).27
As with orthodox opinio juris, corporate statements need
not be subjected to an inquiry of whether the company really
meant what it said. The statement and the obeisance that it
communicates to others is sufficient to tick the opinio juris
box.28 This function is particularly valuable in the context of
corporations because it skirts disagreements over whether
commitments are credible or will endure, questions that are
difficult to evaluate for any complex, opaque entity made up
of multiple actors, each of whom may coalesce around a posi-
tion for different reasons.
The use of a doctrine to explain corporate behavior that
is ordinarily applicable only to states may trigger the initial
and understandable objection that corporations are not states.
This is, of course, true. Corporations are different from states
in myriad ways. States, as classical international law defines
them, possess a defined territory, population, government,
and capacity to enter into relations with other states.
29 Compa-
26. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. 99, 1 55 (Feb. 3) (explaining opinio juris in the context of state
immunity).
27. A norm may constitute international law with respect to some actor
(a state party to a treaty) before it is binding on another actor (a state that is
not party). The norm contained in the treaty is international law, but it is
not law that is binding on the state that has not ratified the treaty. However,
a state that is not party to the treaty may still subscribe to the norms con-
tained in the treaty, and its acceptance of the treaty as representative of in-
ternational law binding even as to non-parties is a manifestation of opinio
juris through which the content of the treaty becomes customary interna-
tional law applicable also to states not party to the treaty. In the context of
this article, the practice constitutes companies subscribing to norms that
otherwise would not necessarily be binding upon them under classical theo-
ries of international law.
28. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. 99, 1 55 (Feb. 3) ("Opinio juris ... is reflected in particular in the
assertion by States . . .. ").
29. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Conven-
tion), art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
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nies might arguably possess these latter two qualities, if their
management structure can be considered a form of govern-
ance and their ability to enter into contracts with states and
participate in international investment arbitration can be con-
sidered relations with other states. However, companies do not
have a territory or a population. Their employees remain citi-
zens of a particular state, even if they may more immediately
identify with their corporate affiliation. And the company's
sites of operation and business are still located within states,
subject to those states' laws and jurisdiction.
Indeed, and perhaps most importantly, companies lack
the defining attribute of states: sovereignty. Sovereignty has
been defined in various ways and most agree that it involves
some combination of the right to exclude others as well as a
degree of responsibility for the wellbeing of those within the
sovereign's care. Others have come to challenge the scope of
sovereignty, noting its erosion, failure, and significant limita-
tions both in practical terms and as a theory of statehood.30
This article does not seek to engage that debate, but merely
points out that sovereignty is a significant distinction between
states and companies. Corporations are still creatures and cre-
ations of state law. They cannot charter themselves, and, de-
spite all kinds of legal maneuvering to avoid state jurisdiction,
law, and regulations (such as parent-subsidiary structuring),
companies must be incorporated and headquartered in some
country. Even those companies that inhabit primarily the
world of cyberspace must have a physical home somewhere in
this earthly plane.
What is apparent, however, is that corporations and states
share two crucial characteristics that make the comparison and
application of opinio juris apt. First, states and corporations
are both complex, conglomerate entities made up of various
constituencies and multiple moving parts. They are both made
up of non-unitary institutions and actors, and even the most
concentrated companies (privately held companies controlled
by one family or individual) or dictatorships need other peo-
ple to implement decisions, policies, and work outputs. It is
this multilayered complexity that is the first point of parallel,
30. See Katharina Pistor, From Territorial to Monetary Sovereignty, 18 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 491, 502-08 (2017) (examining the erosion of territo-
rial sovereignty in the global financial system).
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even if it is not an exact mirroring. Second, companies are
active participants in the sphere of international relations.
3 1
The mere fact that international law does not recognize corpo-
rations as formal subjects has not prevented these entities
from being actively involved in the running and operation of
international law, international institutions, and global in-
terchange.
Opinio juris is the appropriate term to describe develop-
ments for multiple reasons. First, there is a substantial benefit
in using a familiar term, even if its definition might differ and
disagreements may arise as to its exact boundaries. Even first-
year international law students are taught opinio juris. Thus,
the common baseline understanding of what opinio juris is
avoids wasting time inventing and defining a new gimmicky
term. Second, opinio juris provides a tool through which to
account for the paradoxical phenomenon of expressing fidel-
ity to law which is not yet law binding on the actor. Indeed, the
process through which a norm may eventually become law is
exactly this repeated declaration of fidelity made prior to an
authoritative external determination of its status of law. As
such, the application of opinio juris provides an answer to the
long-standing question of how corporations may participate in
and act according to international law when they are not
themselves bound by that body of law.
This is not to say, importantly, that opinio juris and cus-
tom more generally will operate in exactly the same way in
terms of the crystallization of a provision or norm into law and
the formal enforcement of that norm once it has become law.
Unlike states, which can generate custom through consistent
practice and opinio juris, this article does not suggest that cor-
porate opinio juris should work in the same formalistic, legalis-
tic way. Rather than creating a rule of customary law binding
on companies, the practices corporations adopt in line with
international law as corporate opinio juris may set standards
for their industry, influencing rather than obliging other com-
31. See, e.g., Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV.
264, 264 (2016) ("Business entities play important and underappreciated
roles in the production of international treaties."); Vaughan Lowe, Corpora-
tions as International Actors and International Law Makers, 14 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L
L. 23, 23 (2004) (noting that "it is the companies that effectively shape and
control the character" of the international dispute settlement process).
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panies to act in a certain way. Corporate opinio juris may
therefore apply both to corporate endorsement of treaty
norms whose broader validity is not in doubt as well as to their
embrace of customary international law. Indeed, states regu-
larly follow existing treaties as codifications of customary inter-
national law, even if they have not ratified the treaty itself.3 2
Accordingly, and with respect to the generalizable im-
pacts of a company's decision making, a company's practice in
line with international law may set the norm for expected busi-
ness behavior. It may become the gold standard of best prac-
tice if other companies follow suit, creating a degree of peer
pressure or management pressure with regard to what share-
holders and other outsider decisionmakers (like investors) be-
lieve to constitute best practice. As such, the corporate adop-
tion of international law becomes something like a rule, but it
does not operate in the same way that customary international
law functions and applies to states.
Corporate opinio juris allows market participants to coa-
lesce around a single standard rather than fear being undercut
or overtaken by a competitor. Pegging the company's behavior
to an international legal standard may ensure that the com-
pany is able to justify its position and easily impart it to peer
companies or convey it to activists and rebellious shareholders
as a measure of good performance relative to competitors. As
such, opinio juris neatly captures the dynamic of companies
endorsing an existing international legal standard or advocat-
ing for a new international law norm and then orienting their
business activities to align with that stance.
B. Past Insights
As the increasing integration of the global economy has
allowed corporations to grow in wealth and stature, scholars
and activists have argued that international law must work to
32. For example, though the United States is not a party to the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) it has accepted UNCLOS as
representative of customary international law and is accordingly bound by its
provisions. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Presidential Pronouncements of Customary In-
ternational Law as an Alternative to the Senate's Advice and Consent, 2015 BYU L.
REV. 1525, 1534-35 (2016) (quoting President Ronald Regan as saying the
UNCLOS "contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans
which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly bal-
ance the interests of all states.").
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restrain corporate activity so as not to overcome the regulatory
limits of the state.33 Corporations are therefore viewed less as
partners in advancing the enforcement of international law
and more as targets whose bad acts require international atten-
tion.34 Because corporations can transcend borders in ways
that undermine states' ability to effectively constrain their ac-
tivities, international institutions provide a possible means
through which to catch such corporate entities when they do
wrong.35
What is therefore articulated in much of the scholarship
concerning linkages between states, corporations and interna-
tional law is a hierarchical relationship between states and cor-
porations, with the state ideally at the top and international
law serving as a regulatory stop gap when the state is unable to
effectively prevent the wrongdoing of business actors.36 This
hierarchy is very much in line with general understandings of
33. SeeJohn H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(2008) (discussing efforts to incorporate private duties into human rights
law); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Re-
sponsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001) (examining the role of international law
in regulating corporate actors).
34. See, e.g., Erika R. George, Incorporating Rights: Empire, Global Enterprise,
and Global Justice, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 917, 957-58 (2013) (noting that the
"power of private commercial actors is .. . under scrutiny" under interna-
tional law); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations
and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 47, 82 (2002) (arguing that
"given corporate unwillingness to accept social obligations as part of the bus-
iness ethic, governmental regulation is essential.").
35. SeeJohn Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving Inter-
national Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 819 (2007) (noting that "the state-
based system of global governance has struggled for more than a generation
to adjust to the expanding reach and growing influence of transnational cor-
porations" while international institutions have "attempted to establish bind-
ing international rules to govern the activities of transnationals . . . ."); cf
William Magnuson, Unilateral Corporate Regulation, 17 CHI. J. INT'L L. 521
(2017) (exploring the possibility of international regulation and instead ad-
vocating for states to impose unilateral corporate regulations).
36. See, e.g., Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the US. Abdicating the Policing of Mul-
tinational Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien
Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 259, 262 (2012) (noting that multina-
tional corporations have outgrown their national regulatory regimes and
that "extraterritorial jurisdiction has become necessary."); James G. Stewart,
The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes: Transcending the
Alien Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 121 (2014) (arguing for "coup-
ling corporate criminal liability with international crimes in national sys-
tems").
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the position of corporations in relation to the state within the
general structure of international law. As both Carlos Vazquez
and Melissa Durkee explain, international obligations are usu-
ally implemented through a state instruction to the corpora-
tion to comply with some domestic prohibition or through a
statute that codifies an international rule or norm. 7 As such,
the state is understood to scold and punish the corporation
according to the precepts of international law.
The principal gap in this legal conversation loop lies
where and when the state can no longer effectively enforce
such an instruction to the corporation. As the UN Secretary
General's Special Representative for Business and Human
Rights, John Ruggie, observed in his widely cited 2008 report
framing the central problem in the field, "[t]he root cause of
the business and human rights predicament today lies in the
governance gaps created by globalization . . . These govern-
ance gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful
acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or
reparation."38 Ruggie endeavored to articulate norms to struc-
ture the connection between states, corporations, and interna-
tional law based on the premise that, "[g]overnments are
uniquely placed to foster corporate cultures in which respect-
ing rights is an integral part of doing business."39 Ruggie later
built on this report and produced a set of Guiding Principles
that has become one of the most discussed interventions in
this sphere (Guiding Principles).40 The Guiding Principles af-
37. See Durkee, supra note 21, at 67 (observing how some treaties "antici-
pate domestic implementation through regulation of private actors."); Vaz-
quez, supra note 25, at 930 (observing that international norms are most
commonly imposed on corporations by "imposing an obligation on states to
regulate non-state actors," such that, "for the most part, international law
regulates such non-states actors indirectly").
38. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises), Protect, Respect and Remedy, A Framework for Business and Human
Rights, 1 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter United Nations
Framework].
39. Id. ¶ 29.
40. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/
31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. On the importance of
the Guiding Principles, see, for example, Erika George, Expanding the Array
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firm the primary obligation of the state to restrain and punish
human rights abuses committed by business actors,41 and
much international legal scholarship of the past several years
has mirrored this hierarchical understanding.42
This article, however, is more concerned with a question
that Ruggie addressed in his earlier U.N. work: what happens
when the state itself has fallen out of compliance with interna-
tional law? This article interrogates that question and exam-
ines instances when, rather than simply going along with state
conduct, corporations have instead marshaled an understand-
ing of international law so as to object and push back.
Ruggie alluded to the possibility that the state may some-
times be the wrongdoer in his earlier U.N. work. He observed
that corporations may be bound by an obligation not to be
complicit in situations in which human rights abuses or "actual
harm is committed by another party . . . including govern-
ments . . . ."43 As such, Ruggie seems to have briefly enter-
tained the notion that corporations might use international
law as a shield to avoid facilitating the bad acts of states. Yet by
the time of the final publication of Ruggie's Guiding Princi-
ples in 2011, this role for corporations as a possible check on
internationally unlawful state action had largely disappeared.
Perhaps because of push back from states critical of the focus
on the potential of companies to check state action,44 there is
scant discussion of the role of corporations in challenging
state activities.
This article fills the gap in Ruggie's work by illustrating
how corporations, guided by corporate opinio juris, may use
international law to critique and constrain the state. The arti-
cle's first intervention is to substantiate this possibility and
of Accountable Actors: Human Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 109 Am.
SOc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 246, 247 (2015) (observing that the Guiding Principles
"are emerging as the leading global standard against which to assess and
regulate the social impact of corporate conduct.").
41. Guiding Principles, supra note 40, at 6.
42. See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, HuMAN RIGHTs OBLIGATIONS OF NON-
STATE AcroRs 11 (2006) (noting the traditional view that "because the state
has privatized . . . activities, it remains responsible for how they are con-
ducted .... ").
43. United Nations Framework, supra note 38, 1 73.
44. See Guiding Principles, supra note 40, at 3 (observing that a proposal to
impose human rights duties on companies evoked "little support from Gov-
ernments").
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bring it to the fore in a way that others have not. While this
article runs parallel to the existing field of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), its contribution is distinct. CSR's pri-
mary focus relates to a company's voluntary commitments and
cultivation of internal value systems for reorienting its behav-
ior.45 Further, CSR is inclusive of both socially beneficial aims
as well as legally obligatory norms. The goal of this article is
slightly different; it highlights companies' decisions to order
their business affairs according to international law, specifi-
cally focusing on instances where that decision making is also
directed toward depriving another actor-whom the company
has deemed to be out of compliance with international law-
of its services. Avoiding complicity in some other actor's
wrongdoing may be motivated by a sense of legal duty but may
also be intended to sanction wrongdoing where abstention ei-
ther deprives the wrongdoer of legitimacy or removes some
necessary instrument from the wrongdoer's hands.4 In other
words, this article argues that corporations have legal con-
sciousness and act or withhold action to avoid violating inter-
national law or to influence or punish some other actor for its
violation of international law. This is difference from CSR be-
cause international law supplies the announced rationale
rather than broadly construed social benefit, and the course a
company pursues is one in line with advancing international
law generally rather than solely aligning its behavior with some
social value.
This article focuses on corporate commitment to law
rather than broadly construed social or internal values in or-
der to address that perhaps more challenging aspect of the
corporate-international interface. It sets the bar high and
selects examples accordingly, pinpointing examples where the
45. See generally, HEVINA S. DASHWOOD, THE RISE OF GLOBAL CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: MINING AND THE SPREAD OF GLOBAL NORMS (2012)
(describing CSR as "voluntary or quasi-voluntary initiatives undertaken by
the private sector" in the environmental, labor, and human rights fields);
JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY'
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (2006) (noting that
the "underlying philosophy" of CSR is that "drivers for companies to act ethi-
cally and to do good, above and beyond minimum legal requirements,
should come primarily from employees, investors, consumers and the gen-
eral public," not from the government).
46. Boycotts are the prototypical example of this dual function of absten-
tion.
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company itself embraces international law. This structure pro-
vides a means through which to anticipate and undermine the
skeptical response that law does no work here and that inter-
national law in particular has no free-standing authority or in-
dependent value.
This article did not begin the process of unpacking the
role of companies as active participants in the international
legal system, but it is among the first to offer a general frame-
work to bring together these diffuse insights. Though much
useful scholarship tracing interaction among states and corpo-
rations as mediated by international law has been produced,
little has engaged with the corporate-state divergence inspired
by international law or used it to construct an overarching the-
ory, as this article attempts to do. While Melissa Durkee,
Anupam Chander, and Julian Arato have each, for example,
charted how corporations promulgate new rules of interna-
tional law to regulate their own conduct or to apply to the con-
duct of states, these scholars have not thoroughly engaged the
possibility that international law serves as the rationale for cor-
porations to diverge from states.4 7 Similarly, Kishanthi Parella
has outlined how corporations may incorporate international
legal standards into their supply chain management proce-
dures so as to police other business entities down the chain,
but her account does not capture international law as a means
for corporations to critique state action and thereby to distin-
guish between adherence to domestic versus international
law.48 Moreover, though their work is of immense value in ex-
plaining the implications for territoriality and sovereignty of
companies providing internet-based technological innova-
tions, neither Kate Klonick nor Kristen Eichensehr provide a
sustained treatment of corporate invocation of international
47. See Melissa J. Durkee, International Lobbying Law, 127 YALE L.J. 1742
(2018) (describing how corporations influence international law through
lobbying); Durkee, supra note 31 ("Business entities play important and un-
derappreciated roles in the production of international treaties."); Julian
Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 229 (2015) (arguing
that "multinational corporations have acquired the power to create primary
rules of international law.. . ."); Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1807 (2012) (noting how Facebook has influenced changes in law).
48. Kishanthi Parella, Improving Human Rights Compliance in Supply
Chains, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727 (2019).
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law as a claim of authority to oppose state conduct.49 And,
while Laura Dickinson has argued that states ought to ensure
that international legal obligations are an integral part of their
contracts with corporate entities in privatized state functions,50
the assumption underlying her account is that the state, not
the company, will take the initiative to include these interna-
tional legal norms in their contractual arrangements.
Within the particular sub-field of global tobacco regula-
tion, however, Harold Koh and Sergio Puig have examined to-
bacco companies' especially aggressive use of the means and
mechanisms of international law to promote their own self-in-
terest.51 This valuable work sets forth the potential harm of
deploying international law as a mere pretext for corporate
self-interest, and insights from this work provide a frame of
reference for discussion of the normativity of the phenome-
non of corporate opinio juris. It is the work of this article to
expand discussion of corporate opinio juris beyond the scope
of global tobacco regulation and to unpack the potentially
sweeping implications that arise from its widespread nature.
49. See Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2495 (2020)
(discussing the limited impact of the Facebook Oversight Board on govern-
ments); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Gov-
erning Online Speech, 131 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1601-02 (2018) (arguing that
private online platforms which moderate user-generated content "are best
thought of as self-regulating private entities, governing speech within the
coverage of the First Amendment by reflecting the democratic culture and
norms of their users"); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95
TEX. L. REV. 467, 520 (2017) (framing public-private cooperation in the
sphere of cybersecurity as a form of partnership but noting briefly that "[i]n
the wake of the Snowden disclosures, many companies have taken a more
pro-privacy and thus more adversarial stance vis-A-vis the government.").
50. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs
and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 135, 142-43 (2005) (explaining that "provisions in government con-
tracts might explicitly incorporate" a variety of international law norms to
"render private actors contractually liable for violations . ... ").
51. See Harold Hongju Koh, Global Tobacco Control as a Health and Human
Rights Imperative, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 433, 442-43 (2016) (noting that tobacco
companies could invoke human rights claims to invalidate national regula-
tions); Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV. INr'L
L.J. 383, 385 (2016) (analyzing "how tobacco companies have strategically
relied on international law to defend product differentiation and the pre-
vention of consumer confusion . . .. ").
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Accordingly, the next section offers various examples of
corporate opinio juris in action to show both its relevance and
potential contribution for broadening and adding much-
needed nuance to current understandings of interactions be-
tween corporations and international law.
III. CORPORATE OpIio JulUs IN ACTION
Any scholarly account that purports to substantiate its
claim through the production of examples is open to allega-
tions of bias in the selection of such examples.52 Certainly, it is
for the author to inform the reader as to why particular exam-
ples were chosen; even once such rationale is provided, it is
easy for critics to seek to undermine a work as incomplete or
biased through challenging the author's rationale for high-
lighting such examples.5 3 This article accepts this risk because
so little has been written on this phenomenon previously and
because the leanings of the great weight of scholarship in this
area do not capture or predict the occurrence of activities like
corporate opinio juris based on international law.54
As such, this article aims not to prove that corporations
engage in corporate opinio juris more than they do not. Such
undertakings to provide a conclusive answer often pursue
small research questions of limited practical import or fail to
52. See, e.g., George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance
Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 382-94 (1996) (pointing to
selection problems in previous accounts that trumpeted state compliance
with treaties). Despite these concerns, argumentation through the discus-
sion of examples is popular in recent scholarship. See, e.g., ALEXANDER L.
GEORGE & ANDREw BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCEs (4th ed. 2005) (discussing the benefits of the case study
method in developing theory); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands,
167 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 681-85 (2019) (developing the theory of parity and
neutrality of companies in relation to states through examples of certain
companies); Klonick, The New Governors, supra note 49, at 1603 (discussing
how YouTube, Facebook and Twitter moderate online content to demon-
strate modern online governance and free expression).
53. Eric A. Posner, Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons' Mobilizing for
Human Rights, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT' L. & POL. 819, 826 (2012).
54. For an illustration of this concept in the context of defining and elu-
cidate a new concept of uncivil obedience, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen &
David Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811 (2015) (noting
that the bulk of previous scholarship has focused on the differing paradigm
of civil disobedience and that "[u]ncivil obedience inverts these terms.").
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offer constructive insights with respect to hard problems.55
This article is an invitation to begin a scholarly conversation,
not the final word, and this section's objective is to illustrate
that the phenomenon of corporate opinio juris exists, espe-
cially with respect to companies that most would regard as
fairly influential in terms of their market share, size, and sway
as a standard-setter among their peer entities.
There are, of course, limits to such an approach. The ex-
amples in this article do not capture every kind of business
entity or every legal culture. It would be unusual to expect, for
example, that state-owned enterprises oppose the state in the
way that the private companies discussed here have publicly
objected to state conduct.5 6 Such discussions may very well oc-
cur behind the scenes, obscured behind the wall of govern-
ment secrecy. While it may be a useful next study to probe how
state-owned enterprises guide state officials toward compliance
with international law, that is not the focus of this article.
It may also be objected that a random sample set of com-
panies should be chosen, in line with the "experimental" ratio-
nale for which some recent international law scholarship advo-
cates.57 This random sample could then be analyzed, and in-
sights drawn accordingly. Yet this approach may well miss
emerging trends or innovations that have not become quite so
ubiquitous or evenly distributed as to be captured through the
selection of a random sample. As such, it risks missing innova-
tion at the frontier.
Moreover, other actors may need an example to follow as
inspiration or may seek to orient their decision-making
around relevant or perceived authoritative practice. "Google is
doing it" is the sort of argument that might well be deployed
to justify to some constituency within the company that inter-
national law should be taken into account. However, overlook-
55. See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in Interna-
tional Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2012) (asserting that
"[r]educing complex social realities to indicators and measures that can be
used in statistical analysis is often difficult.").
56. Cf. Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 682 (limiting the scope of Digital
Switzerlands to private technology companies that are "likely, though not
certain to remain independent of direct government control.").
57. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why the Study of Interna-
tional Law Needs Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 215-16 (2013)
(discussing the problem of selection bias in causal inference).
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ing such innovation could leave actors that look to others for
guidance in ignorance of a development that could otherwise
have triggered crowd-driven coalescence around a new stan-
dard of behavior. As such, the experimental methodology
could have the effect of unduly influencing future behavior by
suppressing attention to innovation if the sampled companies
do not evince the innovative behaviors of others.
More generally, it has long been understood that the role
of a scholar of international law is not merely to highlight set-
tled law in the manner seemingly envisaged by a purely de-
scriptive, experimentalist approach, but also to discern and
give voice to new trends and possibilities.
The examples rendered here were chosen according to
the following rationale: They each illustrate a different facet of
the phenomenon of corporate opinio juris, either because of
the type of action that the company undertakes in deviating
from the state or because of the category of agent that led the
corporation toward such a course of action.
A. Cathay Pacific and the Hong Kong Protests
Amidst widespread protests in Hong Kong, Chinese gov-
ernment officials forced business to take sides: Support the
Beijing-backed administration and be allowed to do business
in mainland China's lucrative market or resist and face signifi-
cant financial harm.58
As part of this broader effort, China's Civil Aviation Ad-
ministration (CAAC) ordered Hong Kong's flagship airline,
Cathay Pacific, to divulge the names of all personnel involved
58. Amy Gunia, In Hong Kong Employees Hide Their Political Leanings as
Beijing Forces Companies to Take Sides, TIME (Sept. 16, 2019), https://
time.com/5668266/hong-kong-business-china-protests-economy-workforce-
politics/ [https://perma.cc/C3AJ-6ZL2]; Sui-Lee Wee & Raymond Zhong,
China Pressures Business Over Hong Kong. Workers Get Caught in the Middle., N.Y.
TIMES (Aug 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/18/business/
economy/hong-kong-china-business-workers.html [https://perma.cc/3KC3-
ALP5]. See also Joyu Wang & Chuin-Wei Yap, Hong Kong Protests Drag Nike,
Other Global Companies into Upheaval, WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2019), https://
www.wsj. com/articles/businessesget-caught-up-in-hong-kong-protests-
11563363063 [https://perma.cc/E5VC-HVZS] (noting that taking sides can
result in increased popularity or "angry backlash" for Hong Kong busi-
nesses).
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in or supportive of the protest movement.59 These staff mem-
bers were to be banned from Chinese airspace,60 and as most
of Cathay's flights use Chinese airspace, appearing on such a
list would significantly curtail an employee's ability to fly for
the airline.6 1 Non-compliance would be financially ruinous for
the company.62
Cathay at first sought to demonstrate its allegiance to the
mainland administration by firing several employees who had
either voiced their views online or who had been arrested at
illegal protests.63 But divulging names of political dissidents to
the CAAC was apparently a step too far. Instead of complying,
reports of the incident indicate that the company's CEO, Ru-
pert Hogg, provided the CAAC with a list bearing only his own
59. Danny Lee, Cathay Pacific Sacks Two Ground Staff over Passenger Informa-
tion Leak and Says Pilot Charged over Hong Kong Protests Has Been Removed from
Flying Duties, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 10, 2019), https://
www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/transport/article/3022263/cathay-pa-
cific-tells-employees-expect-increased-security [https://perma.cc/A2YM-
UVS7]; see Jamie Freed, As Protests Rack Hong Kong China Watchdog Has Ca-
thay Staff 'Walking on Eggshells', REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2019, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-cathay-pacific-insi/as-pro-
tests-rack-hong-kong-china-watchdog-has-cathay-staff-walking-on-eggshells-
idUSKBN1WIOMA [https://perma.cc/X5MA-MBXM] ("[T]he Civil Aviation
Authority of China ... called for the suspension of staff who supported or
participated in the demonstrations .... ").
60. Josephine Ma et al., China Bans Cathay Pacific Staff Involved in Hong
Kong 'Unlawful' Protests from Mainland Routes, S. CHINA MORNING POsT (Aug.
9, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3022200/
china-bans-cathay-pacific-staff-involved-hong-kong-protests [https://
perma.cc/QTA4-ZRL4]; Blake Schmidt, China Cracks Down on Cathay After
Staff Join Hong Kong Protests, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2019), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-09/china-bars-cathay-pacific-
staff-who-took-part-in-protests [https://perma.cc/SP9N-EL7T]; Noah Sin &
Stella Qiu, China Orders Cathay Pacific to Suspend Staff Backing Hong Kong Pro-
tests, REuTERs (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hong
kong-protests-cathay-pacific/china-orders-athay-pacific-to-suspend-staff-back
ing-hong-kong-protests-idUSKCN1UZ197 [https://perma.cc/ZB5U-87BT].
61. Freed, supra note 59 (labeling the ban "a de facto career killer.").
62. Wee & Zhong, supra note 58 (noting that inability to use Chinese
airspace would require expensive rerouting).
63. Jane Li, A Cathay Pacific Labor Leader Was Fired for Her Facebook Posts on
Hong Kong's Protests, QUARTz (Aug. 23, 2019), https://qz.com/1693696/ca-
thay-labor-leader-fired-over-facebook-posts-on-hong-kong-protests/ [https://
perma.cc/G9NK-LLDD].
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name.64 Rather than exposing the activists employed by the
company, he then resigned.65 The chair of Cathay's board,
John Slosar, resigned shortly after.
6 6
Slosar had previously spoken out in favor of freedom of
speech and conscience for Cathay's employees,
67 and the
choice of Hogg and Slosar not to comply is in line with Ca-
thay's declared human rights policy.68 Indeed, the company
has previously made clear that it views "respecting the human
rights of our employees" as "a fundamental responsibility."
69
Further, Cathay's parent company, the Swire Group (an entity
for which both Slosar and Hogg had worked for many years),
has similarly affirmed that "[w]e respect internationally recog-
64. Matt Keeley, Cathay Pacific's New CEO Pledges to Comply with Beijing,
While Taiwan Media Says Previous CEO Refused, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.newsweek.com/cathay-ceo-refused-name-hong-kong-protesters-
chinese-government-named-himself-instead-resigned-1455371 [https://
perma.cc/VQ3G-APQR]; Billie Thomson, Former Cathay Pacific CEO Is Hailed
a Hero for "Defying China" After Rumours Suggested He Handed Over a List with
Just His Name on It When Asked by Beijing to Identify Staff Who Backed Hong Kong
Protests, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 20, 2019); https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti-
cle-7375913/Former-Cathay-Pacific-CEO-hailed-hero-defying-China.html
[https://perma.cc/QFA3-APJT]; Arthur Villasanta, Cathay Pacific CEO
Praised for Not Giving Names of StaffJoining Hong Kong Protest, INT'L Bus. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.ibtimes.com/cathay-pacific-ceo-praised-not-
giving-names-staff-joining-hong-kong-protest-
2 815487  [https://perma.cc/
4HGF-2CTT].
65. Villasanta, supra note 64.
66. Cathay Pacific Chairman Steps Down amid Hong Kong Protests, L.A. TIMES




67. See Eamon Barrett, Cathay Pacific Vowed Not to Keep Staff from Hong
Kong's Protests. Then Beijing Intervened, FoRTUNE (Aug. 12, 2019), https://for-
tune.com/201
9 /08/12/cathay-pacific-employees-hong-kong-protest/
[https://perma.cc/4STD-28DY] (observing that "Slosar told reporters the
company 'wouldn't dream' of telling staff 'what they have to think,' implying
employees were free to participate in protests."); Tiffany May, Cathay Pacific's
Chairman Resigns as China Pressures Hong Kong Business, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/business/cathay-pacific-
chairman-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/N95C-Z53M] ("Slosar had said
the political views of employees were not the airline's business.").
68. Human Rights Policy, CATHAY PAC., https://www.cathaypacific.com/
content/dam/focal-point/cx/about-us/responsible-business/Cathay-Pacific-
Airways-LimitedHuman-Rights-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TGX-QAER]
(last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
69. Id.
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nized human rights in line with the principles and guidelines
contained in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights" and "informed by the International
Bill of Human Rights ... ."70
Although the company's new management eventually
complied with the CAAC's demand,71 this incident indicates
the possibility of a company's management seeking to defy
edicts of an administration that they believe to be contrary to
international law, even at the expense of the company's imme-
diate profit margin.
To be clear, many companies chose instead to evince
their support for the Beijing-backed Hong Kong Administra-
tion. Some justified their conduct according to a different in-
terpretation of international law based on the principle of
state sovereignty and the related notion of freedom from
outside interference. For example, after an anonymous group
claiming to be composed of employees of the Big Four ac-
counting firms placed an ad in a local newspaper expressing
support for the protests, the management of each company
issued a response statement renouncing the anonymous ad
and instead proclaiming support for the sitting Administra-
tion.7 2 One of those firms, PwC, stated, "[w]e firmly oppose
any action and statement that challenge national sover-
eignty."73 Another firm, Deloitte, declared that it was "commit-
ted to supporting Hong Kong, as a part of China . . . predi-
70. Human Rights Policy, SwiRE PAC. (May 2019), https://www.swire.com/
en/sustainability/sd_policy/humanrights.pdf [https://perma.cc/83PT-
69EK].
71. Sacked Hong Kong Cathay Staff Decry 'Cultural Revolution' Purge, H.K.
FREE PREsS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/10/01/
sacked-hong-kong-cathay-staff-decry-cultural-revolution-purge/ [https://
perma.cc/6JC5-3GCN].
72. James Patterson, Big 4 Accounting Firms Fear China Wrath After Newspa-
per Ad Supporting Hong Kong Protests, INT'L Bus. TIMEs (Aug. 20, 2019), https:/
/www.ibtimes.com/big-4-accounting-firms-fear-china-wrath-after-newspaper-
ad-supporting-hong-kong-2815579 [https://perma.cc/AA5A-UXT8]; Ray-
mond Zhong et al., As Hong Kong Firms Fall in Line Over Protests, Some Workers
Push Back, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/
23/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-accountants.html [https://perma.cc/
M9QC-ACXR].
73. Big Four Accounting Firms Condemn Violent, Illegal Acts in Hong Kong,
XINHUA (Aug. 17, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/17/
c_138314834.htm [https://perma.cc/NB7Z-AVRV].
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cated on the 'One Country, Two Systems' concept, under-
pinned by the Basic Law."7 4
As such, international law may be used both to justify op-
position to a government and its policies or to justify support
for such an entity. The multi-textured quality of international
law and its consequent amenability to multiple interpretations
underlies this divergence. But international law does not differ
so much from domestic law in this respect; hard cases often
involve disputes between two sides that might be said to lay
near equal claim to some legal justification or entitlement.7 5
B. Google, Project Maven, and JEDI
Project Maven is a research study funded by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense (DoD) to enhance the processing of
video imagery used in drone weapon targeting.76 Google first
accepted a contract from the DoD to develop the artificial in-
telligence (Al) technology underlying Project Maven shortly
after the project began in April 2017.77 However, once
Google's employees learned of the contract, they swiftly began
to coordinate their objections to pressure the company to
change course.7 8 A group of employees addressed Google's
head of cloud computing, Diane Greene, expressing their con-
cern over the company's Al technology being used to wage
74. Press Release, Deloitte, Deloitte Media Statement, https://
www2.deloitte.com/cn/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/deloitte-an
nouncement.html [https://perma.cc/EQ7B-U344] (last visited July 18,
2020).
75. See Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps, 132 HAxv. L. REv. 28
(2018) (using Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) as an example of such a hard case).
76. Cheryl Pellerin, Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithms to War Zone
by Year's End, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. (July 21, 2017), https://dod.defense.gov/
News/Article/Article/1254719/proj ect-maven-to-deploy-computer-algo
rithms-to-war-zone-by-years-end/Kate [https://perma.cc/37LB-A7KH].
77. Dell Cameron & Kate Conger, Google Is Helping the Pentagon Build AI
for Drones, GIZMODO (Mar. 6, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/google-is-helping-
the-pentagon-build-ai-for-drones-1823464533 [https://perma.cc/4QR8-
HB2G].
78. See Liam Tung, Google Employee Protest: Now Google Backs off Pentagon
Drone AI Project, ZDNET (June 4, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/
google-employee-protests-now-google-backs-off-pentagon-drone-ai-project/
[https://perma.cc/5KEF-H2EP] (noting that more than 4,000 employees
"signed a petition calling on Google to quit its work and about a dozen em-
ployees have quit due to its involvement . . .. ").
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war.79 Greene responded that the technology being developed
would not be used to "operate or fly drones" or "to launch
weapons."80 However, the potential for such tools to be put to
these ends once sold to the government left many employees
dissatisfied. Over a dozen consequently resigned in protest,8 1
and several thousand signed a petition urging Google to with-
draw from its work for the government in this area.8 2 The peti-
tion implored Google to live up to its "Don't Be Evil" motto
and argued that the company should develop and enforce a
clear policy that "neither Google nor its contractors will ever
build warfare technology."83 The United Nations Charter (of
which the United States is a founding state party) expressly
prohibits the use of force against another state, and the Arms
Trade Treaty (of which the United States is a signatory) specif-
ically forbids states from exporting arms to places where there
is an "overriding risk" that such weaponry will be used "to com-
mit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanita-
rian law [or] ... of international human rights law".8 4 How-
ever, the petition did not explicitly invoke adherence to the
commands of international law as its principal rationale.85 In-
stead, the employee petition framed the argument against
Google's Al work for the government according to the com-
pany's values, ethical principles, and moral responsibility. The
employees accordingly declared that the company "cannot
outsource the moral responsibility of our technologies to third
parties" and asserted that Google had an inescapable responsi-
79. Letter from Google employees to Sundar Pichai, Chief Exec. Officer,
Google, https://static0l.nyt.com/files/2018/technology/googleletter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W4DN-652G] [hereinafter Google Letter]
80. Id.
81. Kate Conger, Google Employees Resign in Protest Against Pentagon Con-
tract, GizMono (May 14, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/google-employees-re-
sign-in-protest-against-pentagon-con-1825729300 [https://perma.cc/BQ85-
CFK3].
82. Scott Shane & Daisuke Wakabayashi, 'The Business of War': Google Em-
ployees Protest Work for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-pro-
ject.html [https://perma.cc/5LHR-YMLC].
83. Google Letter, supra note 79.
84. U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4; Arms Trade Treaty, art. 7, Apr. 2, 2013, 3013
U.N.T.S.
85. Google Letter, supra note 79.
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bility to ensure that its products are used properly, even when
sold to the government.86
Apparently persuaded or sufficiently eager to avoid fur-
ther employee action, Google responded first by declining to
renew its contract for Project Maven with the DoD in March
2019.87 But, what is particularly interesting for the purposes of
this article is what the company did next: Google then promul-
gated a set of principles designed to orient any future con-
tracts and he public sector in this sphere of AI.88 These Al
Principles drew significantly on and explicitly made reference
to international law,89 promising that Google "will not design
or deploy Al" technologies that "gather or use information for
surveillance violating internationally accepted norms," nor
would the company develop technology that "contravenes
widely accepted principles of international law and human
rights."90 As such, the company took employee discontent re-
garding its seeming lack of fidelity to its values as an impetus
and refrained its policy position for future government con-
tracts according to international law.
Google then issued a white paper in which it explicitly ad-
vocated for the adoption of "international standards and
norms" to "relieve pressure on individual countries and re-
gions to advance a controversial use of technology," thereby
"preventing a race to the bottom."9 1 Though companies are
often blamed for instigating such races, Google affirmed its
wish to stand in the way of such a downward, deregulatory spi-
ral. The company further acknowledged that "while interna-
tional treaties cannot in themselves prevent violations, they
86. Id.
87. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Scott Shane, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon
Contract That Upset Employees, N.Y. T1MEs (June 1, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-pentagon-project-ma
ven.html [https://perma.cc/X8PT-VMJK].
88. Artificial Intelligence at Google: Our Principles, GOGLE Al, https://
ai.google/principles/ [https://perma.cc/75B6-QY75] (last visited Jan. 8,
2021).
89. Ashley Deeks, A New Tool for Tech Companies: International Law,
LAwFARE (May 30, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-tool-tech-com-
panies-international-law [https://perma.cc/MM7L-72C7].
90. Artificial Intelligence at Google: Our Principles, supra note 88.
91. Perspectives on Issues in AI Governance, GooGLE 4 (2019), https://
ai.google/static/documents/perspectives-on-issues-in-ai-governance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68RU-FVMQ].
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clarify shared expectations of behavior and thus serve as a met-
ric against which sanctions can be imposed for misuse."92 Such
an observable metric would, according to Google, promote a
"level playing field within industry and rais [e] the bar for re-
sponsible use."93
While the articulation of Google's commitment to inter-
national law remains fairly general, leaving it a fair degree of
interpretative latitude, it would be a mistake to dismiss the
company's statements as mere "cheap talk." 94 Indeed, when
asked why it declined to bid for a multibillion dollar cloud
computing contract with the DoD for the U.S. government's
Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Project,95 a
company spokesperson confirmed that Google passed up the
opportunity because "we couldn't be assured that it would
align with our Al Principles."9 6 Evidently, Google's commit-
ment to international law, as expressed through its AI Princi-
ples, led the company to refuse a potential government con-
tract because the company did not believe with certainty that
the government would act in a manner compatible with inter-
national law. As such, Google denied the government of its
highly talented staff and significant knowledge because it
feared that the state would not honor the company's princi-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. On the subject of "cheap talk" and arguing that states make interna-
tional law commitments only to break them when they cut against their na-
tional interest, see GOLDSMITH &. POSNER, supra note 9, at 177-80.
95. HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RES. SERV., THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S
JEDI CLOUD PROGRAM 11 (Aug. 2, 2019); Kate Conger et. al, Microsoft Wins
Pentagon's $10 Billion JEDI Contract, Thwarting Amazon, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/technology/dod-jedi-con-
tract.html [https://perma.cc/V9D5-7DQ3].
96. Aaron Gregg, Google Bows Out of Pentagon's $10 Billion Cloud-Computing
Race, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi-
ness/2018/10/09/google-bows-out-out-pentagons-billion-cloud-computing-
race/ [https://perma.cc/4565-HGMK]; Naomi Nix, Google Drops Out of Pen-
tagon's $10 Billion Cloud Competition, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2018), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-08/google-drops-out-of-penta-
gon-s-10-billion-cloud-competition [https://perma.cc/H5C6-EQCN]; Liam
Tung, Google: Here's Why We're Pulling Out of Pentagon's $10bn JEDI Cloud Race,
ZDNET (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-heres-why-
were-pulling-out-of-pentagons-iObn-jedi-cloud-race/ [https://perma.cc/
XJ2L-YGTF].
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ples, principles explicitly oriented around international law
standards and human rights.
C. Banks and Funding Illegal Weapons Systems
Resistance to state action is not always undertaken di-
rectly. Instead, companies sometimes reject work with other
actors that facilitate state violations of international law. In this
way, companies may exert a degree of pressure on the state if
the targeted company is important to the state's end enter-
prise.
Such an example occurred recently with regard to financ-
ing for Elbit, a major supplier of arms to Israel and the coun-
try's largest weapons manufacturer.97 In November 2018, Elbit
acquired the automated weapons division, IMI Systems, from
the Israeli government.98 At the time, the company claimed
that this purchase would transform it into a one-stop shop for
purchasing weapons systems and move it into "a different cate-
gory of defense companies."9 9 However, multinational bank
HSBC, a major financier for Elbit, reacted to the acquisition
adversely and withdrew its investments in the company the
next month.10 0 HSBC claimed that IMI had been engaged in
97. Seth J. Frantzman, Israel's Revolutionary Defense Industry, JERUSALEM
PosT (May 23, 2019), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israels-revolution-
ary-defense-industry-5903
70 [https://perma.cc/Q2L4-H4PL]; see also Hagai
Amit, Israeli Army Inks $127-Million Deal with Elbit to Develop Next Generation of
Artillery Cannons, HAARETZ (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/business/.premium-israeli-army-inks-127-million-deal-with-elbit-to-de-
velop-new-artillery-cannons-1.7063208 [https://perma.cc/LH6J-PMMD]
(announcing major contracts between Elbit and the Israeli Defense Minis-
try).
98. Elbit Completes Purchase of Israel's IMI After Government Approval,
REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-elbit-systems-
imi/elbit-completes-purchase-of-israels-imi-after-government-approval-
idUSKCN1NUOHK [https://perma.cc/5NMD-FGA3].
99. Seth J. Frantzman, With IMI Acquisition, Elbit Looks to Be a 'One-Stop
Shop'for Defense Needs, DEF. NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.defensenews.
com/industry/2019/03/27/with-imi-acquisition-elbit-looks-to-be-a-one-stop-
shop-for-defense-needs/ [https://perma.cc/Y5X6-J5VF].
100. Avraham Gold & Tovah Lazaroff, Citing Human Rights, HSBC Bank to




rope's Largest Bank to Divest from Israeli Defense Contractor Following BDS Cam-
paign, HAARETZ (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/busi-
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the production of illegal weapons, namely cluster bombs, and
that this practice would continue under Elbit.' 0 ' The bank ac-
cordingly announced that it would be severing ties with Elbit
and cutting off the company's funding sources.102
HSBC's banking operations in Israel have long been the
target of Boycott-Divestment-Sanctions (BDS) campaigns.103
BDS activists allege that Israel oppresses Palestinians through
its long-running occupation and hope to "pressure Israel to
comply with international law."1 04 But the movement's activi-
ties have not been uncontroversial, and some have alleged that
its targeting of Israel belies nefarious motives.105
Despite lobbying from BDS activists, however, HSBC
stressed that a desire to adhere to international law, not pres-
sure from BDS, motivated it to divest from Elbit.106 Cluster
bombs are banned under the Cluster Munitions Convention,
to which 106 countries are party.107 Though Israel itself is not
a party to the convention, cluster munitions are also illegal
under customary international law, which prohibits the use of
ness/europe-s-largest-bank-hsbc-divest-israel-elbit-bds-1.6788301 [https://
perma.cc/DVK6-BWMX].
101. Tovah Lazaroff, HSBC Tells 'Post': 'We Divested from Elbit Over Cluster




103. See UK Banks 'Complicit' in Palestinian Oppression, Rights Group Claims,
BDS (July 12, 2017), https://bdsmovement.net/uk-banks-complicit-arms-
trade [https://perma.cc/I18Z3-5AH4] (calling HSBC a "'crucial link in the
chain' of Palestinian oppression.").
104. What is BDS?, BDS, https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds [https://
perma.cc/9DRT-W3J6] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
105. See, e.g., Trudeau Blasts BDS Movement as Anti-Semitic, TIMES ISR. (Jan.
17, 2019), https://www.timesofisrael.com/trudeau-blasts-bds-movement-as-
anti-semitic/ [https://perma.cc/93AW-ZQJ7] (quoting Canadian Prime
Minister, Justin Trudeau, as claiming that BDS evinces "the three Ds: demon-
ization of Israel, a double standard around Israel and a delegitimization of
the State of Israel.").
106. Lazaroff, supra note 101.
107. Convention on Cluster Munitions, art. 1, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S.
39; Universalization Status by Region, CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS,
http://www.clusterconvention.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/1.-CCM-
Universalization-Status-by-Region-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B4M-GPYN]
(last visited Jan. 8, 2020).
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weapons that do not discriminate between civilians and com-
batants.108
Moreover, in taking this stance against the use of technol-
ogy deemed contrary to international law, HSBC is not an out-
lier. Several years earlier, Danske Bank, Denmark's largest
bank, also decided to divest from Elbit, citing the company's
provision of surveillance systems to the Israeli government for
its border wall with Occupied Palestine.
109 The International
Court of Justice had already declared the construction and
maintenance of the wall to be a violation of international
law. 110 Echoing this position, Danske Bank stated that it would
not invest client money "in companies that violate interna-
tional standards."1 The bank clarified that while its previous
investment position was not "in itself against national legisla-
tion," it "adheres to UN conventions" and believes that "the
settlements are illegal and a hindrance to a peaceful solu-
tion."112
Such corporate opposition is notably not without financial
consequence. Mischaracterizing these attempts to promote in-
ternational law as boycotts of Israel motivated purely by ani-
mus, various U.S. states (including New York and New Jersey)
have in turn announced boycotts of the banks involved and
sought to withdraw their business.
1 13 Thus, to say that these
private actors' decisions to support international law are moti-
108. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 1577-78 (Jean-
Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (discussing numerous
U.N. General Assembly resolutions calling for prohibiting or restricting
weapons "which might be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have in-
discriminate effects").
109. Israeli Companies Excluded from Bank's Investments, COPENHAGEN POST
(Jan. 25, 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20100131114212/http:/
www.cphpost.dk/component/content/48048.html?task=view.
110. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 1 163 (July 9).
111. Israeli Companies Excluded from Bank's Investments, supra note 109.
112. Id.
113. See Lindsey Lawton, A New Loyalty Oath: New York's Targeted Ban on
State Funds for Palestinian Boycott Supporters, 42 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
649, 668, 674 (2019) (examining New York State's sanctions on BDS); Benja-
min Weinthal, New Jersey Bans Business with Danish Bank for Israel Boycott, JERU-
SALEM POST (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.jpost.com/BDS-THREAT/New-
Jersey-bans-business-with-Danish-bank-for-Israel-boycott-519925 [https://
perma.cc/Z3KF-RA99] (reporting that New Jersey "divested all of its invest-
ment from the Danish bank Danske due to its boycott of Israeli companies").
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vated solely by profit from positive publicity does not ade-
quately capture thepotential harm that may flow from support-
ing and seeking to advance a particular interpretation of inter-
national law when state officials have chosen a different
course. Indeed, there may be negative financial consequences
to the adoption of such a stance. These harms beg the ques-
tion whether corporate opinio juris is motivated purely by
profit or whether something else might explain the adherence
to a course of action these banks claim best aligns with what
international law requires.
Of course, one may here distinguish between long-term
and short-term profit maximization. It is possible that compli-
ance with the law is motivated by long-term profit maximiza-
tion, but such a prospect and its potential payoffs may well be
less certain. These general payoffs are explored in greater de-
tail later.
D. Jerusalem Infrastructure Projects
The city of Jerusalem has long been a source of height-
ened tension in the ongoing dispute between Israel and Pales-
tine.1 1 4 Israel currently occupies East Jerusalem, and Palestine
claims this area as its own territory and future capital." 5 Both
the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council have de-
clared aspects of Israel's operations in East Jerusalem to be il-
legal under international law,116 but the legal consequences of
these determinations for companies that operate in the Occu-
pied Territories remain a source of controversy.
Thus, when the Israeli Government sought to extend the
city's light rail system through occupied East Jerusalem and
solicited tender bids for the project from a range of compa-
nies, divestment activists swiftly launched a pressure campaign
against these tendering firms." 7 Veolia and Alstom, two
French firms who had long performed contracts in Israel on
114. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 11 75-79.
115. S.C. Res. 478 (Aug. 20, 1980).
116. G.A. Res. ES-10/13, 1 1 (Oct. 27, 2003); G.A. Res. ES-10/2, 1 3 (Apr.
25, 1997); S.C. Res. 2334, 1 1 (Dec. 23, 2016); S.C. Res. 478, supra note 115,
1 2.
117. Peggy Cidor, A Long and Winding Rail, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 22,
2019), https://www.jpost.com/In-Jerusalem/A-long-and-winding-rail-581333
[https://perma.cc/G9V7-TS9Q].
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other public works projects, joined a consortium to bid for the
contracts. Shortly thereafter, the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation sued Alstom and Veolia in French courts, claiming that
the project and Alstom and Veolia's involvement therein vio-
lated international humanitarian law.
118 The Versailles Court
of Appeals, however, found that Alstom and Veolia's conduct
was not unlawful because the international humanitarian law
obligations governing the treatment of occupied lands apply
only to states.119 As such, the companies were free to pursue
the project, at least according to the court's interpretation of
international law.120 Yet despite this apparent victory, Veolia
announced that it would withdraw from the project in 2015,
and Alstom made a similar announcement in 2019.121 Neither
company has said much about the rationale for their with-
drawal, but Alstom's Israeli business partners, Dan and Electra,
sent a furious letter to the Israeli government explaining that
Alstom's decision to exit was "entirely based on the Israeli-Pal-
estinian conflict" and that the company was concerned that
the project would "ostensibly harm or [is] liable to harm
human rights."122 Accordingly, Alstom appears to have justi-
118. Raphael Ahren, French Court's Light Rail Ruling Breaks No Legal Ground,
Scholars Say, TIMES ISR. (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.timesofisrael.com/
french-ruling-on-jerusalems-light-rail-adds-nothing-new-scholars-say/
[https://perma.cc/JVD6-R2C7].
119. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, 3e ch., Mar.
22, 2013, 11/05331, 23 ("Les societes intim~es morales de droit priv6 qui ne
sont pas signataires des conventions invoques, ni destinataires des obliga-
tions qui les contiennent, ne sont pas, en consequence, des sujets de droit
international. D(pourvues de la personnalit6 internationale, elles ne
peuvent se voir opposer les differentes normes dont se pr~vaut l'appelante."
[The private law corporate respondent companies which are not signatories
of the conventions invoked, nor recipients of the obligations that they con-
tain, are not, consequently, subjects of international law. Devoid of interna-
tional personality, they cannot be bound by the different norms on which
the appellant relies.]).
120. Id. at 31-32.
121. Stephane Richard, Transdev Exits Jerusalem Light Rail Project, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ed506bOc-4f
3 7-11e5-
b029-b9d50a74fd14 [https://perma.cc/CFK4-PG4S]; French Company Drops
Tender Bid for Light Rail Because It Enters East Jerusalem, TIMES ISR. (May 16,
2019), https://www.timesofisrael.com/french-company-drops-tender-bid-
for-light-rail-over-east-Jerusalem-lines [https://perma.cc/S6B7-TS7U].
122. Eytan Halon, French Firm Could Face Lawsuit After Quitting Jerusalem
Light Rail Tender, JERUSALEM PosT (May 16, 2019), https://www.jpost.com/
Israel-News/French-firm-could-face-lawsuit-after-quitting-Jerusalem-light-rail-
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fied its withdrawal from the project on the basis of interna-
tional law.
Similarly, in an earlier government project in East Jerusa-
lem for a wastewater treatment plant, Dutch engineering firm
Royal HaskoningDHV withdrew its bid because it "carries out
its work ... in compliance with international laws and regula-
tions" and believed that " future involvement in the project
could be in violation of international law." 123 Accordingly, it
affirmed that this "led to the company's independent decision
to end its involvement in the project."124 The company notably
added that it "was not pressured by the Dutch government to
do so" and that "[t]here is no boycott of Israel by Royal Has-
koningDHV."12 5
In sum, the companies involved in both these instances
were not subject to the command of their home states. In-
stead, they each reached and sought to implement their own
interpretation of international law.
E. Microsoft and Data Sharing
As commerce and personal activity are increasingly con-
ducted over the internet, technology companies are vital part-
ners for law enforcement when online fora are used to commit
or plan crimes.12 6 These companies usually comply readily
when government actors request data to aid in prosecutions,
as they can charge a steep price for their assistance. For exam-
ple, Microsoft has charged the FBI hundreds of thousands of
dollars a month for access to user data.127
tender-589735 [https://perma.cc/U85X-YLD4]; Lee Naim ?? ????,
(@naimleee), TwrrrER (May 12, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://twitter.com/
naimleee/status/1127591150817284098 [https://perma.cc/4LWS-4Y53].
123. Press Release, Royal HaskoningDHV, Explaining Royal Haskon-
ingDHV's Decision to Terminate Involvement in Wastewater Treatment Pro-





126. See Edward Lucas, The Spycraft Revolution, FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 27,
2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/27/the-spycraft-revolution-espi-
onage-technology/ [https://perma.cc/7VKZ-CX5U] (asserting that
"[p]rivate contractors have become an essential part of the spy world.").
127. Kevin Collier & Frank Berkman, Hacked Emails Show what Microsoft
Charges the FBI for User Data, DAILY DOT (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.daily
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
469
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
However, in United States v. Microsoft,128 the tech giant re-
fused such a request. In that case, Microsoft argued that be-
cause the data it held was stored on servers outside the United
States, surrendering it to U.S. officials would violate interna-
tional law.129 Microsoft argued that the relevant statute only
allowed the government to request data held within the
United States and that the government should use the existing
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) procedure to obtain
the data.130 While the case inspired extensive commentary on
the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the limits of
state power,131 little has been said about Microsoft's embrace
of international law as its justification for rejecting the govern-
ment's instruction.
Microsoft consistently maintained that international law
required a different outcome. At the district court level, for
example, Microsoft asserted that under the current search war-
rant procedure, "U.S. privacy interests are satisfied. But inter-
national law says that we are not allowed to engage in police
searches and seizures in foreign lands without the consent and
knowledge of the foreign government."13 2 Similarly, before
the Second Circuit, the company founded its opposition upon
"international law norms that the Government's excursion
would violate" and further argued that "a law enforcement ac-
dot.com/news/microsoft-compliance-emails-fbi-ditu/ [https://perma.cc/
UWF2-H2R2].
128. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
129. Id. at 1187.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REv. 179, 188
(2018) (examining the Second Circuit's ruling on the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act); Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 Yale L.J.
326, 328 (2015) (discussing "[t]he question of where the relevant state ac-
tion takes place when the government compels the production of e-mails
from an Internet Service Provider . . . ."); Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating
Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328, 335 (2018) (combining "scholarship
about the regulation of data and scholarship about foreign affairs"); Andrew
Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 732 (2016)
(noting that Microsoft Corp. raises "a much larger problem: while many peo-
ple now store their most personal data in the cloud-that is, on remote serv-
ers scattered around the globe-there is no settled understanding of who
has jurisdiction over that data.").
132. Transcript of Proceedings at 15, In re Warrant to Search a Certain
Email Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp.
3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 1:13-mj-02814-UA).
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tion taken without the sovereign's permission breaches inter-
national law."13 3 Finally, in its brief to the Supreme Court,
Microsoft even scolded the government for "ignoring carefully
negotiated international agreements," claiming that "the Gov-
ernment may rely on the international cooperative mecha-
nisms it has used for decades to obtain evidence located in
foreign countries."134 As such, Microsoft acknowledged that
domestic law might legitimate the Government's request, but
invoked international law in opposition to the Government's
position.
Of particular note, the company argued that it, not the
government, was acting as the legitimate protector of Ameri-
can sovereignty and the rights of U.S. citizens. The company
contended that "[t]he government's position means when
China or Russia ... does that next week, we have no claim that
this infringes on our sovereignty," which is "a very, very dan-
gerous principle .... "11 Microsoft similarly asserted that the
government's proposed search "has profound foreign policy
consequences" and "threatens the privacy of U.S. citizens" be-
cause "[t]he Golden Rule applies as much to international re-
lations as to other human relations."136
Various other tech companies critiqued the government's
position as an affront to international law that could create
harmful consequences for the rights of U.S. persons. In their
joint amicus brief, Amazon, Apple, Cisco, Facebook, Google,
Verizon, and several other very large technology and commu-
nications companies opposed the government's position be-
cause it would "undermine existing international treaties"
through which "the U.S. government has endorsed a specific
set of procedures" designed "to strike a balance between one
nation's law enforcement needs and another nation's auton-
133. Brief for Appellant at 33, 51, In re Warrant to Search a Certain Email
Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d
Cir. 2014) (No. 14-2985-cv).
134. Brief for Respondent at 14, 57, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138
S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 17-2).
135. Transcript of Proceedings at 52, In re Warrant to Search a Certain
Email Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp.
3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 1:13-mj-02814-UA).
136. Brief for Appellant at 3, In re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Ac-
count Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir.
2014) (No. 14-2985-cv).
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omy . . . ."137 These companies further contended that
"[e]very nation founded on democratic principles has a strong
and legitimate interest in ensuring that the security and pri-
vacy of the people it is charged with protecting are not im-
properly or unduly invaded", and that "[f]ailure to accommo-
date that legitimate sovereign interested threatens to provoke
dangerous reciprocation by foreign governments-at great po-
tential cost to U.S. citizens and service providers."138 Similarly,
twelve business and consumer associations including the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, observed in their joint amicus brief
that allowing the government's warrant to stand would "under-
mine ... the practical reality of the international egal system,"
"violat[e] fundamental principles of international comity,"
and "threaten the privacy and security of U.S. citizens and
businesses."13 9 As such, these corporate actors positioned
themselves as defenders of the international legal system and
the privacy rights of U.S. citizens against the overstepping of
the U.S. government.
The Supreme Court ultimately declared the case moot be-
cause Congress changed the underlying statutory regime
through the adoption of the CLOUD Act.140 While the
CLOUD Act extends the Stored Communications Act (SCA)
specifically to authorize warrants to compel the surrender of
data controlled by U.S. companies but stored overseas (thus
resolving the dispute before the Court concerning the SCA's
extraterritorial reach), the new legislation also instructs the ex-
ecutive to negotiate new international agreements to regulate
such requests from other countries for data stored in the
United States.141 The Department ofJustice asserted that these
changes were necessary because Microsoft's litigation efforts
had "effectively hamstrung the ability of law enforcement to
obtain data from U.S. communications service providers who
137. Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondent at 23, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No.
17-2).
138. Id. at 21.
139. Brief of 12 Business and Consumer Associations as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 6, 20, 23, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S.
Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 17-2).
140. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018).
141. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, §§ 103, 105,
132 Stat 1213, 1213-24 (2018) [hereinafter CLOUD Act].
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
472 [Vol. 53:433
2021] CORPORATE COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
store data outside the United States."142 Microsoft itself issued
a declaration of six principles to guide the newly crafted statu-
tory regime, including a requirement that "the demand is not
in furtherance of an investigation that infringes on interna-
tionally recognized fundamental human rights."14 3 The final
statute reflects Microsoft's concern by only authorizing the
U.S. government to enter into executive agreements to allow
foreign countries access to data stored in the United States if
"the foreign government . . . adheres to applicable interna-
tional human rights obligations and commitments or demon-
strates respect for international universal human
rights . .. "144 Accordingly, the insistence of Microsoft and
other corporations that an international law-compliant solu-
tion be found was eventually adopted.
IV. PREDICTING CORPORATE OPrNIO JURIS
Though corporate opinio juris has demonstrable analyti-
cal value as the basis for a theoretical paradigm, there are ob-
stacles to its use as a tool to predict such instances in the fu-
ture. A prerequisite question is which body of predictive litera-
ture ought to orient the model of corporate opinio juris.
There is a robust scholarly conversation regarding when indi-
viduals and firms follow the law and why they do so,145 but
analyses are usually framed in the context of domestic law and
presuppose a fairly firm legal rule. When international law is
included, the focus is on the behavior of states, not corpora-
142. Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Across Borders: Facilitating Coopera-
tion and Protecting Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2017) (statement of Brad
Wiegmann, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Just.).
143. Six PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS GOVERNING LAw-EN-




144. CLOUD Act, supra note 141, at 1218.
145. See, e.g., John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking Com-
pliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 49 (2020) (proposing a "compliance
clawback" system for executive pay in cases of wrongdoing); Veronica Root,
Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 1003, 1036 (2017)
(advocating for a regulatory emphasis on recidivist companies); FREDERICK
SCHAUER, TIHE FORCE OF LAw (2015) (exploring "various aspects of law's co-
ercive dimension . . .. ").
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tions.14 6 Relatedly, though there exists important literature un-
packing business decisions on what kind of entity to form
(whether to incorporate as a B-Corp, for example) and how to
keep an enterprise faithful to its founders' understanding of
fulfilling social good, such CSR-aligned accounts are oriented
toward business behavior in pursuit of vague notions of the
collective good, not corporate action in compliance with some
notion of law, even if ill-defined.1 4 7
Corporate interfacing with international law to create
opinio juris by definition occurs in an area where the rule is
neither clear, fully formed, nor even necessarily applicable to
the category of actors (corporations) whose adherence is
sought to be forecast. But there is still some understanding of
coalescence around a legal standard, even if not necessarily
applicable to the corporate actors who have decided to take up
its mantle. Indeed, one point of opinio juris is to bridge the
gap between mere custom or social nicety and law. Further,
though there is much literature predicting the formation of
customary international law, the presupposition is that the ac-
tors making, accepting and applying such custom are states.1 4 8
This section finds these bodies of scholarship informative, but
not directly applicable. Inspired and guided by them, this arti-
cle seeks to craft a predictive account derived both from gen-
146. See, e.g., RICHARD McADAms, THE ExPREssIvE PowERS oF LAW: THEO-
RLES AND LIMrrs 67-70 (2015) (discussing the role of coordination and focal
points amongst states in international law).
147. SeeJennifer S. Fan, The Role of Corporations in Social Movements, 9 HARv.
Bus. L. REV. 441, 441 (2019) (discussing how "court cases and changing
norms about the role of the corporation .. . laid the groundwork for corpo-
rations' involvement in social movements"); Suntae Kim et al, Why Companies
Are Becoming B Corporations, HARv. Bus. REV. (June 17, 2016), https://
hbr.org/2016/06/why-companies-are-becoming-b-corporations [https://
perma.cc/H93Y-P497] (explaining that the key drivers of the emergence of
B Corporations include the "increasing efforts of more conventional profit-
driven companies to be seen as 'green' and 'good'" as well as "the move-
ment of creating a new economy with a new set of rules").
148. See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, Making Sense of Customary International Law,
118 MICH. L. REV. 1487, 1490-91 (2020) (arguing that we should think of
CIL as less of a rulebook and more like an inherently "contingent and varia-
ble kind of law."); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27
MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 141 (2005) (examining the common observation that
"international law cannot bind states without their consent, and notions of
consent are often said to be the basis for CIL.").
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eral understandings elsewhere in legal scholarship as well as
an inductive theory drawn from the examples uncovered.
As the above examples illustrate, corporate opinio juris
may be formed through a variety of factors, the proportions
and exact ratio of which may differ significantly. Companies
are not unitary entities. Instead, they are composed of many
subcomponents and interest groups that are both within the
corporate form and outside of it. The account here draws on
the transnational legal process theory of Harold Koh and the
international relations and liberal internationalist approaches
of Anne-Marie Slaughter that have expanded understandings
of states and their adherence to international law14 9 to present
corporations as complex, multilayered entities composed of
groups with different affiliations, preferences, and goals in or-
der to frame the predictive model of corporate opinio juris.
In order to forecast the occurrence of corporate opinio
juris, this article understands companies' interactions with in-
ternational law along three interface axes that hold predictive
value for foreshadowing the likely occurrence of corporate
opinio juris: pressure, strategy and identity. These categories
are linked and there may be overlap between them, but they
are intended to provide a framework rather than a precise tax-
onomy.
A. Pressure
Corporate commitment through pressure involves the ex-
ertion of influence by employees, shareholders and various
constituencies within the managerial structure and board of
the company. Pressure may also come from states other than
the company's place of incorporation or principal place of
business who have chosen to condition market access on com-
pliance with international law, scolding from international or-
ganizations, customer preferences, and campaigning from ac-
tivists and NGOs that seek to influence the company to align
its conduct with international law.
This account is necessarily general because companies are
formed and structured in different ways according to their
home legal systems. But this pressure framework is, to some
149. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181
(1996); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations:
Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
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extent, perennial and universal, with the particular form of the
company required by its national law altering the ability of
each constituency to exercise its pressure function effectively.
As the examples above illustrate, critique and argumenta-
tion are often crucial elements in the formulation of corporate
opinio juris. This is particularly so because corporations are
not itself usually invited to the treaty negotiation table. As
such, companies are not necessarily part of the intended audi-
ence for the legal norms that their opinio juris eventually en-
dorses, especially when their home states or places of business
do not share such amenability to international law's instruc-
tion. There is thus a process of argumentation and negotiation
that involves the company shifting from its position outside
the formal legal framework to a point that is actively support-
ive of international law.
This process sometimes occurs via negative publicity
which in turn drives customers, shareholders and employees
to apply pressure upon the company and move it toward com-
mitting to international law. Thus, in the example of Google
and Project Maven above, employee activism and the necessity
of employee talent for a company like Google to succeed com-
bined to move the company toward the international stan-
dards that its employees had called upon it to respect.150
A further example of pressure coalitions may also be help-
ful in illustrating this point. When the Trump administration
began detaining immigrant children in steel-fenced cages and
tearing families apart in 2018, public outcry was swift and the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights quickly con-
demned the practice as illegal. 151 International law generally
150. See generally Jennifer S. Fan, Employees as Regulators: The New Private
Ordering in High Technology Companies, 2019 UTAH L. REv. 973, 1026 ("The
continued impact of employee-initiated private ordering remains to be seen,
but as long as there is a demand for this group of highly skilled employees,
they will continue to have a voice.").
151. Beth Van Schaack, New Proof Surfaces That Family Separation Was About
Deterrence and Punishment, Jusr SECURrTY (Nov. 27, 2018), https://
www.justsecurity.org/61621/proof-surfaces-family-separation-deterrence-
punishment/ [https://perma.cc/Y4UR-YKRB]; David Shepardson, Trump
Says Family Separations Deter Illegal Immigration, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-trump/trump-says-
family-separations-deter-illegal-immigration-idUSKCN1MO00C [https://
perma.cc/MQ23-U2AB]; Nick Cumming-Bruce, Taking Migrant Children from
Parents Is Illegal, U.N. Tells U.S., N.Y. TIMEs (June 5, 2018), https://
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guarantees a universal right to family life against which no
state may arbitrarily interfere,15 2 and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child affirms that "States Parties shall ensure that
a child shall not be separated from his or her parents .... "153
Shortly after, tweets and Facebook posts from airline em-
ployees expressing their outrage made the public aware that
the U.S. government was flying immigrant children separated
from their parents out of the country on various private air-
lines.154 This revelation snowballed into negative publicity for
the airlines.155 These companies had already committed to
general human rights principles in various internal polices,
but the employee activism and the bad press that it produced
moved these companies to assert their previous human rights
commitments so as to withhold their services from facilitating
the child separation program.156 In statements paralleling in-
ternational rules, six major airlines declared that they would
not allow their aircraft to be used for the purpose of separat-
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/world/americas/us-un-migrant-children-
families.html [https://perma.cc/PPF5-LQX3].
152. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation
as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 213 (2003) (identi-
fying and comparing international legal norms to establish family separation
as a violation of international law).
153. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 9, Nov. 29, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
154. Amy Pollard, Flight Attendants Want No Part in Separating Immigrant
Children from Parents, SLATE (June 20, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/06/flight-attendants-oppose-trump-administrations-family-sep-
aration-policy.html [https://perma.cc/LPD3-STFL].
155. Emily Stewart, Airlines to Trump: We Won't Help You Separate Migrant
Kids from Parents, Vox (June 20, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/20/
17485544/family-separation-united-american-airlines [https://perma.cc/
Q9VQ-ZTCE].
156. See, e.g., AM. AIRuNEs Bus. ETHICS & COMPLIANCE OFF., STANDARDS OF
BUSINESS CONDUCT FOR EMPLOYEES 23, https://www.aa.com/content/
images/customer-service/about-us/corporate-governance/standards-of-busi-
ness-conduct-for-employees.pdf [https://perma.cc/B385-58ND] (declaring
that American Airlines is "committed to respecting human rights" and that
conducts "business in a manner that protects human rights and the rights of
children within our sphere of influence"); UNITED, CODE OF ETHICS AND BUS-
INESS CONDUCr 18-19 (Aug. 2020), http://ir.united.com/static-files/
3482652b-31b24b3e-be3c-69c773b12e11 [https://perma.cc/G9TZ-PRTA]
(affirming that the company "respects . .. international principles on human
rights" and "is not complicit in human rights abuses.")
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ing immigrant families. 157 Spirit Airlines announced that it
would not "knowingly participate in transporting immigrant
children away from their parents and families." 158 United flag-
ged its "serious concerns about this policy" by instructing that
the government "should not transport immigrant children on
United aircraft who have been separated from their par-
ents,"159 and American Airlines insisted that it had "no desire
to be associated with separating families, or worse, to profit
from it."160
Pressure may also impel the formation of corporate
opinio juris. An increasingly important mechanism in this re-
spect is benchmarking. Benchmarking is a process in interna-
tional commerce through which a ratings agency or evaluator
of a particular standard grades entities according to a system
of rankings.161 States are commonly benchmarked with re-
spect to their sovereign debt and credit ratings, but the pro-
cess may also be applied to companies. As a measure of
benchmarking's significance, major global law firms like White
& Case, Freshfields, and DLA Piper, among others, now ac-
tively advise clients on how they may improve their
benchmarking scores.162 A growing number of NGOs, like
157. Annalisa Merelli, All the US Airlines that Refused to Fly Separated Immi-
grant Children-and the Ones that Did Not, QUARTz (June 21, 2018), https://
qz.com/1311588/which-us-airlines-are-not-working-with-ice/ [https://
perma.cc/A65V-TAFT].
158. Spirit Airlines (@SpiritAirlines), TwiTrTER (June 20, 2018, 5:05 PM),
https://twitter.com/SpiritAirlines/status/1009542862877360128 [https://
perma.cc/H65T-NBHC].
159. United Airlines (@united), TwrrrER (June 20, 2018, 1:37 PM),
https://twitter.com/united/status/1009490504688525312 [https://
perma.cc/45NS-LA7X].
160. Press Release, American Airlines, Statement on Recent Reports of
Separated Families (June 20, 2018), http://news.aa.com/news/news-de-
tails/2018/Statement-on-Recent-Reports-of-Separated-Families/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/G5B8-FTD6].
161. CLARE CONNELLAN ET AL., WHrrE & CASE, HUMAN RIGHTS BENCH-
MARKS: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE RANKINGS ON THE RISE 1 (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.whitecase.com/sites/default/files/2020-01 /human-rights-
benchmarks-2020-01-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/69BA-XH8C].
162. Id.; Authoritative Human Rights Advice, FRESHFIELDs, https://
www.freshfields.com/en-us/what-we-do/services/disputes-litigation-and-arbi-
tration/business-and-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/TDT2-5EVU] (last
visited Jan. 8, 2021); Daniel D'Ambrosio, Business and Human Rights: Interac-
tion of Human Rights Impact Assessment and Legal Advisory Work, DLA PIPER
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Know the Chain in the apparel and footwear industry,
16 3 have
undertaken benchmarking projects to give to consumers and
investors an easily understandable rating of the various compa-
nies in the sector to guide their shopping preferences.
164 And
financial institutions have included benchmarking indices in
their evaluation of whether and at what rate to offer financing
to a variety of commercial transactions. For instance, in both
the Equator Principles (regarding financing infrastructure
projects) and the Poseidon Principles (regarding financing
shipping transactions), the world's major banks have agreed to
incorporate compliance with international law into their
calculus on whether and under what terms to grant a loan.
165
Remediation of any violations of international law from the
company's proposed project is a requirement which, if unsatis-
fied, may constitute a default on the loan itself.
166
Because loans may be bought and sold between financial
institutions, companies have an incentive to comply with the
terms of international law if their current or future creditors
have themselves decided on a standard for financing that is
inclusive of such legal norms. Furthermore, because failure to
abide by international law may, through the Equator and Po-
seidon Principles, constitute an event of default, a company
with a spotty human rights record may be categorized as one
with a higher likelihood of default and thus as a riskier and
(Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/czech/insights/publications/
2018/02/business-and-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/B2DU-NYV2].
163. KNOWTHECHAIN, https://knowthechain.org/ [https://perma.cc/
W4WJ-PRNVI (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
164. See Kishanthi Parella, Improving Human Rights Compliance in Supply
Chains, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 727, 787 (2019) (noting that "consumer re-
lied upon information produced by . .. NGOs and nonprofits in lawsuits
filed against Purina, Nestl6, Mars, and Hershey").
165. POSEIDON PRINCIPLES, https://www.poseidonprinciples.org/#home
[https://perma.cc/4R95-C9HB] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021); see Butler, supra
note 11 (discussing how the Equator Principles incorporate international
law standards).




Principle 3: Accountability, POSEIDON PRINCIPLES, https://www.poseidonprlnci
ples.org/principles/enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/Q4PN-2DF3] (last
visited Jan. 8, 2021) ("We will require that ongoing compliance with the Po-
seidon Principles is made contractual in our new Business Activities using
standardized covenant clauses.").
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consequently more expensive investment. Accordingly, to the
extent that international law standards are a criterion for eval-
uation in benchmarking projects, international law forms a
sort of "law in hiding."167
B. Strategy
A second axis to consider is strategy. Strategy may be de-
fined in various ways, but here it is used merely to indicate that
a company either has or hopes for some current or future pay-
off for staking out a position in alignment with international
law, or that a company believes or speculates that it may some-
how profit from such a course.
In the sphere of international investment law, the poten-
tial payoff for a company for adhering to international law is
clear. When a foreign investor claims it has been financially
harmed by the host state in some way, international arbitration
offers a recourse and a remedy. In consumer-driven enter-
prises where the relevant customer base cares about interna-
tional law, declaring commitment to international law may
benefit a company's bottom line.
But strategy is not necessarily or always derived from a
one-time payoff; it may also encompass long-term planning.
Long-term planning is not always apparent, and so an example
of its operation within the structures of business law may be
helpful in perceiving how this strategy may support the forma-
tion of corporate opinio juris. Corporations have recently
sought to communicate their adherence to international law
through the adoption of certification regimes. These certifica-
tions add a stamp of approval to whatever product is manufac-
tured in order to verify the compatibility of the company's ac-
tivities with international law. Securing certification may crys-
talize into a mandatory requirement either because it
constitutes a form of best practice or due diligence or because
some state actor expressly adopts certification as a condition
167. Odette Lienau, Law in Hiding: Market Principles in the Global Legal Or-
der, 68 HASTINGs L.J. 541, 574 (2017). Odette Lienau coined the term "law in
hiding" to refer to market principles that undergird the international debt
markets and are universally accepted despite their seeming lack of both a
formal legal basis and an exact prominence. For further elaboration, see
ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT 202 (2014).
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for market entry.16 8 Indeed, some states have incorporated
certifications into their processes for public procurement or
general market access.16 9
Although popular with activists, adopting an enhanced
standard for doing business legitimately may also increase the
cost of business, thereby raising the barriers to entry for poten-
tial new market participants.
17 0 Where certification requires
adherence to an international law standard that is costly, com-
plex, or not easily verifiable, the requirement may obstruct
new entrants to a market, effectively shielding established mar-
ket participants from being undercut by new competition.
171
Certification processes usually require an ability to know each
step of the supply chain and to be able to trace and document
the route of whatever goods are involved.1
72 Consequently,
committing to and publicly signaling commitment to interna-
tional law may also shield established market participants from
being undercut by fresh competition.
For example, some have argued that the Kimberley Pro-
cess Certification Scheme for ensuring that conflict diamonds
do not reach the market helped entrench De Beers' strangle-
168. See Bradford, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that the "high value of mar-
ket access to the EU explains why many producers are prepared to incur
even significant adjustment costs" to meet the European Union's strict mar-
ket entry standards).
169. See, e.g., Green Public Procurement, EUR. COMM'N, https://
ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/indexen.htm [https://perma.cc/FNR6-
BHH2] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021) (noting that the European Commission
and some European countries have voluntarily promulgated "environmental
criteria for products and services in the public procurement process").
170. See Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institu-
tional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REv., 325, 326, 340
(2009) (concluding that "if the objective of antitrust law is to promote eco-
nomic efficiency, then per se treatment-or any heightened presumption of
illegality-of reputation mechanisms with coordinated punishments is mis-
placed.").
171. This discussion is not intended to advocate for competition from en-
tities that fall below human rights and other international law standards in
their operations. Instead, it is meant to illustrate that companies may have
long-term, strategic interests in the formation of corporate opinio juris that
transcend the profitability of one simple or singular transaction.
172. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compli-
ance, 57 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 2075, 2084-85 (2016) (describing the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations to "induce
greater corporate compliance with federal law.").
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hold over the international diamond trade.173 Tellingly, as
soon as the Kimberly Process was implemented, De Beers set-
tled its decades-long dispute over alleged anticompetitive activ-
ities initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ).1'74 It is
quite possible that the barriers to entry imposed by the certifi-
cation and tracing requirements of the Process were suffi-
ciently onerous to achieve the same outcome lawfully that De
Beers had been seeking in defending the DoJ suit.17 5
Another example of coordinated behavior by market par-
ticipants with a long-term strategy to advance international law
standards is the Global Battery Alliance (GBA). The seventy
private and public members of the GBA in the spheres of in-
ternational environmental law, human rights, and fair labor
protections represent some of the largest stakeholders, as well
as civil society and public sector groups.176 Their stated goals
include establishing "a circular battery value chain as a major
driver to achieve the Paris Agreement" and implementing a
responsible sourcing program to eliminate child and forced
labor in the battery value chain by 2030.177 These are, no
doubt, noble objectives, and the GBA is very clear in linking
them to international law norms. However, the Alliance has
also proposed creating a Battery Passport by 2030. The Battery
Passport would constitute "a digital representation of a battery
conveying information about all applicable environmental, so-
cial, governance and lifecycle requirements based on a com-
prehensive definition of a 'sustainable' battery."178 Eventually,
173. See Virginia Haufler, The Kimberley Process Certification: An Innovation in
Global Governance and Conflict Prevention, 89 J. Bus. ETHics 403, 406 (2010)
(noting that "the new regulatory control regime established by the Kimber-
ley Process may have had the unintended consequence of saving De Beers").
174. Id. See generally BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE: THE DIA-
MOND NETWORK AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE 87 (2017)
(describing the multiple DoJ antitrust lawsuits against De Beers).
175. Id. at 143 (asserting that "the Kimberley Process removed conflict
diamonds from the global market and excluded a source of competition,
giving De Beers a larger market share.").
176. Global Battery Alliance Partners, WORLD ECON. FORUM, https://
www.weforum.org/global-battery-alliance/our-members [https://perma.cc/
573A-NDKV] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021)
177. Global Battery Alliance: Action, WORLD ECON. FORUM, https://www.we
forum.org/global-battery-alliance/action [https://perma.cc/CLT2-47CH]
(last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
178. Id.
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the GBA envisages that the Battery Passport will function as a
"a quality seal" to transform the market for batteries towards
sustainable outcomes by 2030.179 Such a quality seal would po-
tentially transform the market itself. It would make consumers
concerned about international law more likely to buy ap-
proved products, and other companies would be eager to
avoid the risk of negative publicity should any of their compo-
nents be found to come from unapproved sites or processes.
As such, the seal would advantage batteries from GBA produc-
ers, potentially allowing them to charge a premium for the ad-
ded work of verifying the entire supply chain's compliance
with prescribed standards.
If states endorse and mandate such certification
processes, they may also constitute barriers to trade. States
control entry to their own markets, but they are subject to in-
ternational trade and investment agreements to which they are
party. Thus, when the United States adopted its Dolphin-Safe
seal requiring tuna companies to verify that no dolphins were
harmed in their catches, the World Trade Organization
(WTO)'s Dispute Settlement Body ruled that the requirement
inhibited market access in breach of the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs.180 As for the Kimberley Process, the
WTO granted and has continually reauthorized an explicit ex-
emption from its requirements, recognizing that the process
would likely violate trade rules but that states would waive such
claims so as to further the legitimate ends of the scheme.1
81
To be clear, this discussion is not intended to advocate for
competition from entities that fall below human rights and
other international law standards in their operations. Instead,
it is meant to illustrate that companies may have long-term,
strategic interests in the formation of corporate opinio juris
179. Id.
180. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 1
7.1, (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT BISD (39th Supp.) at 41 (1993).
181. Extension of Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for
Rough Diamonds, WTO Doc. WT/L/1039 (July 26, 2018), https://docs.wto.
org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FESS009-DP.aspx?language=E&Catalogue
IdList=247145,246824,24
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that transcend the profitability of one simple or singular trans-
action.
C. Identity
Identity represents two concepts: who a company repre-
sents itself to be and who a company actually is.182 There may
be multiple elements within the component of self-identifica-
tion, depending on the constituency within a company and
the company's external image or brand.
Fidelity to international law is sometimes quite personal
and may therefore be an important part of how corporate offi-
cials conceive of themselves and the companies that they own
or run. For example, Microsoft's advocacy of human rights
and its critique of government actions in this regard can be
seen as the manifestation of its President and Chief Legal Of-
ficer Brad Smith's long-standing commitment to the interna-
tional legal system. For instance, in connection with their re-
cent $1.25 million gift to support the work of Columbia Law
School's Human Rights Clinic, Smith and his wife (and law
school classmate), Kathy Surace-Smith, announced that they
"have been globalists since Law School" and even "married at
the United Nations Chapel."183
For others, like CEO and founder of the multibillion-dol-
lar Epic Games, Tim Sweeney, commitment to human rights
reflects the sort of company he wishes to direct. Moreover, it is
a means to distinguish Epic Games from competitors and culti-
vate a degree of loyalty among users. Although the Chinese
Government has pressured many companies doing business in
China to support the current Hong Kong administration and
ban or block those expressing opposition, Epic, which owns
and runs the highly successful Fortnite game, specified that un-
like its competitor, Blizzard, it would not ban Hong-Kong
based gainers who expressed pro-democracy views.184 Instead,
182. See generally, Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Cosmopolitanism, 47 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 875, 895 (2014) (discussing what the author calls "rights-sensitive
branding").
183. Human Rights Clinic Receives $1.25 Million Gift, COLUM. L. ScH. (Nov.
17, 2017), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/human-rights-
clinic-receives-125-million-gift [https://perma.cc/D53M-EWWB].
184. Steven Russolillo et al., Hong Kong Protests Force Companies to Choose:
Their Employees or China, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/
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Epic declared that it "supports everyone's right to express
their views on politics and human rights" and refused to "ban
or punish a Fortnite player or content creator for speaking on
these topics."185 When Twitter users theorized that Epic would
inevitably cave to the pressure from a major investor because it
is forty percent owned by the Chinese company Tencent,
Sweeney instead declared that reversal of Epic's pro-human
rights policy, even under potential pressure from Tencent,
"will never happen on my watch as the founder, CEO, and
controlling shareholder."186
Similarly, identity may be determined by who composes
the company. Employees may wish to work only for companies
that uphold international norms, and shareholders may like-
wise wish to invest only in such businesses. The self-identifica-
tion of the various actors in each group and their willingness
to pressure companies into a position that upholds interna-
tional law and aligns with the value set or identity of that given
group is an important component for the decision-making of
company leadership.
Identity may also compose a company's position within
the relevant market. If the company is large enough, carries
some unique knowledge, or offers something else distinct, it
may be more willing to stand by its support of international
law knowing that it will not be undercut by rivals. Moreover, if
the company inhabits a fairly saturated market, it may be eas-
ier for it to coordinate with other market participants to jointly
articles/hong-kong-protests-force-companies-to-choose-their-employees-or-
china-11566757662 [https://perma.cc/7627-WR3H].
185. Lulu Yilun Chen & Yuji Nakamura, Inside Tencent's Struggle to Bring
World's Hottest Game to China, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2018), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2018-08-23/fortnite-tencent-and-the-
fate-of-world-s-biggest-game-market [https://perma.cc/RS94-UYBG];
Makena Kelly, Unlike Blizzard, Epic Games Says It Won't Ban Players for Political
Speech, VERGE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2
0 19 /10/ 9 /
20906110/blizzard-hearthstone-ban-hong-kong-china-epic-games-fortnite-
blitzchung [https://perma.cc/4Y69-4VJSI; Chris Kerr, Amid Blizzard's Hong





186. Tim Sweeney (@TimSweeneyEpic), TwrrTER (Oct. 9, 2019, 10:55
AM), https://twitter.com/timsweeneyepic/status/1181946357759844352?s=
21 [https://perma.cc/6KV3-DJXJ].
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endorse and embrace international law as an industry stan-
dard.
Alternatively, it may be that the international law standard
at issue represents some political position or policy preference
about which the company's management or shareholders care
deeply. In this situation, aligning the company's operations
with international law is a means through which the company
may advance this particular commitment. For example, the
1951 Refugee Convention expressly requires that states guar-
antee refugees a right to work.187 States are often reluctant to
comply with this requirement because of a fear of disadvantag-
ing their own nationals or a xenophobic belief that refugees
are a drag on the economy.188 Corporate support for hiring
refugees may be both a means to blunt this argument and a
way to show disagreement with relevant state policy.189 For in-
stance, Greek-style yogurt manufacturer Chobani has led the
way and formed Tent, a non-profit organization to encourage
other companies to hire refugees to which more than one
hundred companies have signed on.190 Chobani's founder
and CEO, himself an immigrant, explained that this effort
arises from his understanding that "[t]he minute [refugees]
get a job, that's the minute they stop being a refugee."191
187. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, arts. 17-19, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
188. SeeJean-Christophe Dumont et al., Hiring Refugees - What Are the Oppor-
tunities and Challenges for Employers?, 10 OECD MIGRATION POL'Y DEBATES 1
(Sept. 2016), https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-
10.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS9Q-MTQK] (arguing that "[m]any employers
do not see an immediate business case for hiring refugees or asylum seek-
ers").
189. See generally Zachary Cohen & Elise Labott, Refugee Levels are Surging
Worldwide. Trump Is Slashing the Number the US Will Let in, CNN (Sept. 18,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/17/politics/pompeo-trump-refugee-
asylum-levels/index.html [https://perma.cc/W4T6-U79J] ("[T]he Trump
administration is capping refugee admissions at the lowest level since
1980.").
190. Cristina Alesci, US Yogurt Billionaire's Solution to Immigration: Humanity
First', CNN (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/30/politics/
chobani-ceo-immigration-solution/index.html [https://perma.cc/BNP3-
JGHJ].
191. Chobani Founder Stands by Hiring Refugees, CBS (Apr. 6, 2017), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/chobani-founder-stands-by-hiring-refugees/
[https://perma.cc/EJB4-G6ZS].
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As this section outlines, corporate opinio juris may be
driven by pressure, strategy, and identity. The exact combina-
tion of these factors will differ with each instance, but under-
standing each category as leading to the formation of corpo-
rate commitments to international law may further empower
activists and officials who seek greater effectiveness of interna-
tional law. Having outlined how to predict the formation of
corporate opinio juris, the next section traces the important
implications of the theory.
V. THE VALUE OF CORPORATE COMMITMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL LAw
A. Realism's Limitations
International law has long been understood as a unique
legal system. Its proponents represent it as a multi-textured
framework with rules amenable to a range of interpretations
and in which signals of authority and strategic policy choices
shape decision-making. Consequently, straightforward princi-
ples that usually apply to legal systems (such as like situations
producing like outcomes) are not guaranteed. International
law's realist critics, on the other hand, describe the system as
one of mimicry that merely masks state self-interest and betrays
its own rhetoric of community and negotiated solutions to
common problems. To the realists, the system is less law than a
cover for state gain, an insight that is supposedly revealed
when states disobey the law when it is not in their interest to
adhere to it.
But the focus of such critiques has largely rested on how
states understand and respond to international law. Though
this perspective is worthwhile (as states are the main subjects
of international law and the principal addressees of its rules),
states are not the only participants in the global system. Corpo-
rations are becoming increasingly present actors on the inter-
national stage, and the realist argument ought not to apply to
them in the same way. Corporations, traditionally understood,
are and should be motivated solely by profit. Though made up
of different factions or elements (management, shareholders,
employees, etc.), the purpose of the corporate entity is to pur-
sue its own financial advancement. As such, one might expect
corporations to be particularly unwilling to endorse any con-
straint on their ability to profit. Therefore, the fact that these
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entities choose to adopt and advance international law to their
own financial detriment by declining state contracts that they
perceive as contrary to international law is of particular inter-
est and import.
The phenomenon of corporate opinio juris may appear to
give credence to theories that advance the moral authority and
"compliance pull" of international law.192 But corporate
opinio juris has the potential to add another dimension to
these earlier analyses of compliance pull by suggesting that the
pull of international law extends to and influences actors be-
yond states, including corporations. Moreover, corporations
may then exert the pull of international law against states.
Corporate opinio juris reveals that, in focusing on states
and their officials, earlier debates on the means and meanings
of international law and its quality as a legal system have been
too narrow. Indeed, instances of corporations turning down
lucrative agreements and declining profitable transactions be-
cause of international law indicate that international law has
more power than it has previously been credited. Moreover,
because legal rules are usually understood as a sovereign func-
tion, a private actor like a corporation instructing a state on its
compliance (or lack thereof) with international law would
seem to indicate that international law possesses a persuasive
power that other scholars have yet to adequately articulate.
Another way in which corporate commitment reveals the
inadequacy of realist theories of international legal obligation
is by highlighting the potential of corporations to use interna-
tional law to advance their own interests. The realist view holds
that a company must choose between international law or self-
interest, but, as the examples in Part III suggest, this dichot-
omy is too limited. Law regularly serves as a tool for giving
value to assets,19 3 so the strategic use of law to advance corpo-
rate interests ought to come as no surprise. It does, however,
undermine the realist position that legal obligation may only
be adduced when it drives conduct that is contrary to self-in-
terest. Law may be used to advance self-interest, and interna-
tional law is no different in that respect. Accordingly, corpo-
192. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 26
(1990).
193. KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPTAL: How THE LAw CREATES
WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 159 (2019).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 53:433488
2021] CORPORATE COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
rate commitment reveals the realist theory to be unnecessarily
limited in its view of the actors in the international legal re-
gime and what their actions tell us about international law.
B. Displacing the State?
In her groundbreaking analysis of the privatization of for-
eign affairs powers and other international functions dis-
charged by public actors, Laura Dickinson urged public offi-
cials to contractually incorporate international law principles
and public values into their dealings with corporations. Her
suggested framework largely mirrored the usual hierarchy of
international-state-corporation instruction, except rather than
ordering compliance with international law through domestic
statute, obligations would be established in contracts for the
privatization of services.19 4 Ultimately, though, the instruction
and insistence on adherence to international law in Dickin-
son's model would ideally come from the state.
Dickinson is hardly alone in her concerns over privatiza-
tion. Philip Alston, in his role as U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights and Poverty, recently pronounced his fear that
increasing privatization will lead to less protection of human
rights because companies are not bound by human rights obli-
gations or subject to the same remedies as states for viola-
tions.19 5 Moreover, Principle 5 of the U.N. Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights envisages a similar hierarchy,
with international institutions instructing states to ensure that
human rights are respected when services are privatized. Ac-
cording to Principle 5, it is for the state to "exercise adequate
oversight in order to meet their international human rights
obligations when they contract with, or legislate for, business
enterprises to provide services that may impact upon the en-
194. See LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING
PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 124 (2014) (sug-
gesting that governments or international organizations could create con-
tracts with private organizations to require public participation).
195. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights), Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/73/396, 1 83 (Sept.
26, 2018); UN Expert: Privatization of Government Services Undermines Human
Rights Protections, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE CTR. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://
ijrcenter.org/2018/10/30/un-expert-privatization-of-government-services-
undermines-human-rights-protections/ [https://perma.cc/TD58-R8G6].
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joyment of human rights."19 6 The official commentary to the
Principle makes clear that "the relevant service contracts or
enabling legislation should clarify the State's expectations that
these enterprises respect human rights" and notes that states
should "ensure that they can effectively oversee the enter-
prises' activities . . . ."197 As such, states are expected to be the
guarantors of human rights protections, even when they dele-
gate the provision of services to companies not under interna-
tional legal human rights obligations. It is for the state to con-
vey its human rights understandings to the company that it
entrusts with the provision of services.
But existing scholarship does not consider how the act of
privatization or even a company's control of a significant share
of a market important to the state may allow the company a
degree of responsibility or leverage to ensure human rights
protections in a way that the state itself has not or does not
seem inclined to do. What Dickinson's account and those of
the others who have come after her overlooks is the possibility
that corporations might instead insist that states comply with
international law through their privatized functions or their
oversight of a certain market of concern to the state. This pos-
sibility is the inverse of Dickinson's model but corporate
opinio juris shows it to be real and potentially significant.
If the company providing the good or undertaking the
service has maintained a commitment to international law and
carries out a promise that its work for the government will be
guided by international law principles, it effectively acts as an
embedded agent of the international system, ensuring the ful-
filment of international law principles even though not neces-
sarily binding on the corporation. This is particularly the case
where the company fulfils or complies with some international
obligation from which the state has sought to derogate.198
Moreover, the potential of achieving international law adher-
ence through corporate opinio juris is not limited to the exam-
ples examined above. Take, for example, the U.N. Global
Compact, which imposes international law-based commit-
196. Guiding Principles, supra note 40, princ. 5.
197. Id.
198. See Butler, supra note 11, at 215 (arguing that private businesses in
these scenarios effectively "become direct agents of the international legal
system . . .. ").
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ments that over nine thousand companies incorporated in 161
different countries have voluntarily pledged to honor. Under
the ten principles of the Global Compact, these companies
have promised to "support and respect the protection of inter-
nationally proclaimed human rights," "make sure that they are
not complicit in human rights abuses," uphold fundamental
labor rights, support environmental protections including the
"precautionary approach to environmental challenges," and
"work against corruption in all its forms . ... "19 The Com-
pact's principles are silent as to whom corporations may
rightly exercise their influence and exert pressure against to
ensure the fulfilment of these obligations, but corporate
opinio juris reveals the possibility of corporations utilizing the
principles as inspiration and authority for ensuring state com-
pliance.
Of course, commitments do not equate always to compli-
ance and a degree of skepticism is certainly warranted. Shift,
an NGO, and Mazars, a global accountancy firm, teamed up in
2015 to establish the U.N. Guiding Principles Reporting
Framework to track corporate commitments to and compli-
ance with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights.200 They have received disclosures from over ninety
well-known companies across a range of different business sec-
tors to date,20 1 but the results are not uniformly positive. The
Guiding Principles Reporting Framework announced that sev-
enty-five percent of the reporting companies have expressly
committed to abide by the Guiding Principles in structuring
their operations,202 and eighty percent of the reporting com-
199. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles [https://
perma.cc/4MN3-2THE] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
200. About Us, U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLEs REPORTING FRAMEWORK, https://
www.ungpreporting.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/SG7H-4FPV] (last vis-
ited Jan. 8, 2021).
201. Reporting Trends and Insights, U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES REPORTING
FRAMEWORK, https://www.ungpreporting.org/database-analysis/reporting-
trends-and-insights/ [https://perma.cc/DB5H-P5ZV] (last visited Jan. 8,
2021).
202. Michelle Langlois, Reporting Trends and Insights: Are Companies Making
the Commitment o Respect Human Rights?, U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLEs REPORTING
FRAMEWORK, https://www.ungpreporting.org/reporting-insights-trends-are-
companies-making-the-commitment-to-respect-human-rights/ [https://
perma.cc/E5XFY59U] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
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panies have established a committee to monitor their corpo-
rate social responsibility.203 But only thirty-one percent clari-
fied how human rights are balanced against other business
considerations and a mere seven percent gave a complete ac-
counting of their chain of decision-making responsibility when
operations raise potential human rights implications.204
Thus, it would seem that companies are eager to pro-
nounce their adherence to human rights principles, but that
such commitments may not be backed with effective mecha-
nisms to ensure their general application. It may be that com-
panies prefer to make ad hoc decisions in this sphere, mani-
festing their subscription to international law when some par-
ticularly critical rule or obligation is at stake or where their
conduct in upholding such a norm is especially vital.
At the end of the day, the state controls entrance to its
own market.205 The state may have subscribed to a variety of
international trade and investment agreements that purport to
dictate equal market access, but these merely lay out rules for
the state to use its power to regulate market access and make
violations more expensive.206 Where that market is especially
lucrative and the state is able to withstand corporate or other
external pressure, then companies may lose and yield to the
preferences of the state to gain market access. Consider, for
example, Cathay Pacific's swift shift to compliance with the
203. Michelle Langlois, Reporting Trends and Insights: Who's Responsible and
Accountable for Addressing Human Rights Risks Within the Company ?, U.N. Gum-
ING PRINCIPLES REPORTING FRAMEWORK, https://www.ungpreporting.org/re-
porting-insights-trends-responsible-accountable-human-rights-risks-
company/ [https://perma.cc/37EN-6RZT] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
204. Id.
205. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, art. XVI, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 183. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. VIII,
XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (discussing import and export fees and
the ability of states to impose exceptions on free trade).
206. See Matthias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitution-
alist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 919 n. 34 (2004) ("It is not
surprising that [multinational corporations] have been among those non-
governmental actors pushing the Rule of Law" because "[c]orporations want
to be able to make strategic decisions knowing that market access according
to international rules will be guaranteed.")
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Chinese Government's directives after a change in company
leadership.2 07
C. Ambiguity and Clear Instructions
When President Trump sought to implement his long-
touted "Muslim ban," a prohibition on entry into the United
States of persons from seven predominantly Muslim countries,
several software engineers at Google brainstormed how they
might respond to and undermine the policy.2 08 Various U.N.
officials had already condemned the policy as contrary to in-
ternational human rights law,209 but instead of taking formal
legal action, these software engineers turned to the technology
that is the bedrock of their company's profitability and mis-
sion. These Googlers, the quasi-national moniker used to refer
to employees of Google, sought to "leverage" the company's
market power and ubiquity so as to "actively counter is-
lamophobic, algorithmically biased results . ... "210 They in-
tended to manipulate the search functionality of Google so
that any Islamophobic searches would instead take users to
pro-immigration groups. As such, they planned to blunt access
to resources underpinning one line of the political controversy
207. See discussion supra Part III(a).
208. John D. McKinnon & Douglas MacMillan, Google Workers Discussed




209. Somini Sengupta, U.N. Leader Says Trump Visa Bans 'Violate Our Basic
Principles, N.Y. TmEs (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/
01/world/trump-immigration-ban-un.html [https://perma.cc/2ASG-
VLGK]; U.N. Rights Chief Says Trump's Travel Ban Is Illegal, REUTERS (Jan. 30,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-immigration-un/u-n-
rights-chief-says-trumps-travel-ban-is-illegal-idINKBN15E1SV [https://
perma.cc/UJL3-MEUG] ; US Travel Ban a 'Significant Setback'for Those Needing
International Protection - UNRights Experts, U.N. NEws (Feb. 1, 2017), https://
news.un.org/en/story/2017/02/550592-us-travel-ban-significant-setback-
those-needing-international-protection-un [https://perma.cc/RC4Y-2NVN];
Adam Withnall, UN Denounces Trump's Travel Ban as Mean-Spirited' and Illegal




210. McKinnon & MacMillan, supra note 208.
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to "re-educate" those with whom they disagreed.21 1 Unfortu-
nately for the Googlers, the plan did not go over well and in
fact caused a good degree of public outrage. President Trump
exploited the story for his own advantage, arguing that it was
further evidence of a deck stacked against him by the "public
enemy" media and tech companies sharing the Google activ-
ists' viewpoints.212 Google's CEO quickly apologized after
emails were leaked to the Wall Street Journal and explained
that the company fostered a culture in which employees could
discuss ideas, no matter how controversial or contrary to the
company's desired public persona and mission.213
This exchange represents both the extraordinary power
of corporations to impact the tools of political discourse and
how the words of international officials may resonate with
groups within corporations (like employees) who may then ac-
cordingly seek to carry out such officials' instructions. This ar-
ticle has highlighted corporate commitment to international
law as an underappreciated element in influencing corporate
decision-making, and it has thus far framed the relationship
between and amongst corporate actors and government offi-
cials largely, though not exclusively, in an oppositional way.
However, the emergence of corporate power to purport-
edly invoke international law to oppose the state raises a fur-
ther question: When must corporations resist? This is not the
first time such a question has been posed, but its treatment has
been cursory at best. For example, in the penultimate page of
his 2018 article on the extraterritorial regulation of tech firms
(or data intermediaries), Andrew Keane Woods asked,
"[w]hen should an intermediary resist the state?"214 Woods
gives no firm response, merely positing that this "complex
211. Id.
212. Alexandra Hutzler, Google Brainstormed Ways to Combat Trump's Travel
Ban by Leveraging Search Results for Pro-Immigration Causes, NEWSWEEK (Sept.
21, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/google-brainstormed-search-func-
tions-mitigate-trump-travel-ban-1132848 [https://perma.cc/2P3W-SBJ8].
213. McKinnon & MacMillan, supra note 208; Jackie Wattles, Google CEO:
'We Do Not Bias Our Products to Favor Any Political Agenda', CNN Bus. (Sept. 23,
2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/23/technology/sundar-pichai-
google-memo/index.html [https://perma.cc/5QTL-4DWS].
214. Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328,
405 (2018).
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question" has "no easy answer . . . ."215 Similarly, Alan
Rozenshtein recently highlighted challenges to state-corporate
cooperation in the national security surveillance industry and
argued that "giant technology companies . . . meaningfully
constrain the government's ability to conduct electronic sur-
veillance."216 However, despite his extensive discussion of cor-
porate-government relations in the surveillance sector,
Rozenshtein neglects the role that international law plays as a
source of standards and inspiration for shaping corporate ob-
jections to state incursions upon civilian privacy. With regard
to the larger question of how corporations should balance
technological developments against social accountability
through the means of representative government,
Rozenshtein, like Woods, admits that, "[u]ltimately, I don't
have a comprehensive answer . ... "217
International law itself does not always produce one an-
swer. Indeed, the system is premised on a balancing of com-
peting interests or a choice between divergent legal norms and
thus sometimes produces several options. While sovereign
states selecting among those options is not very controversial,
people may be less comfortable with companies assuming this
function because they do not fully represent the cross-section
of interests that states are usually expected to take into ac-
count. People may question whether it is appropriate for cor-
porations of different geographic or cultural origins than the
state to scold the state for choosing an alternative balance.
This discomfort may be particularly exaggerated when the
company's management and employees are not drawn from
the legal culture against whose actions the company is pur-
porting to protest. In the Hong Kong protests, for example,
various corporations cited their support for China's national
sovereignty (another well-known international law principle)
as the underlying basis for their decision to denounce the
street protests.218
215. Id.
216. Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99,
185 (2018).
217. Id.
218. See supra Part III. See also Fr~d~ric M~gret, Civil Disobedience and Inter-
national Law: Sketch for a Theoretical Argument, 46 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 160
(2008) (contending that because international law is "historically committed
to sovereignty, order, and the maintenance of the supremacy of institutions
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Thus, the multi-textured nature of international law
might give rise to particular concern. International law is usu-
ally open to multiple interpretations, and companies may be
expected to justify their decisions by choose and cite the inter-
pretation of international law that is most beneficial to their
own interests. Almost twenty years ago in a joint report to the
United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights, Joe Oloka-Onyango and Deepika
Udagama expressed their deep concern that increasing links
between the United Nations and various corporate entities
may give rise to those private actors seeking to exploit the au-
thority of the United Nations for their own ends. They ob-
served that a "danger exists of such linkages being exploited by
the latter [corporations], while only paying lip-service to the
ideals and principles for which the United Nations was created
and to which it continues to be devoted."
219
The beginnings of an answer to the question of when a
corporation may have an obligation to oppose actors not in
compliance with international law were sketched by John Rug-
gie in the Guiding Principles. Principle 19 declares that corpo-
rations should use their "leverage," the same term used by the
Google engineers discussed above, to oppose human rights vi-
olations of other entities.220 While Ruggie began his series of
reports contemplating corporate opposition to the state, his
final product largely casts leverage as a tool to be deployed by
corporations against private actors of equal status and standing
before international law (such as other businesses).221 Further-
more, the prototypical examples given in the commentaries in-
volve utilizing a company's position atop a corporate supply
chain to extract human rights compliance from other busi-
nesses downstream in the production process.
2 22 This is a valu-
able exercise of leverage, but, as this article highlights, it is not
of international regulation [,] "the international system has been "broadly un-
sympathetic to what is often perceived as agitation by individuals").
219. J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama, Comm. on Hum. Rts., Sub-
Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., The Realization of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its Impact on the
Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, 1 61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13
(June 15, 2000).
220. Guiding Principles, supra note 40, princ. 19.
221. Id.
222. Id. princ. 17.
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the only way a corporation may seek to exercise a degree of
power or influence against the state.
Indeed, the Guiding Principles do not fully explain when
leverage must be deployed, perhaps because it is not always
clear either that a violation of international law is being or will
be committed, or that the company is contributing to that vio-
lation in some way that should trigger its obligation to exercise
its leverage to stop it.223 International law is open to interpre-
tation; as the above example of competing norms of human
rights and state sovereignty in Hong Kong illustrates, a com-
pany may either struggle to know which side to pick or may
simply choose the interpretation that allows it to continue the
most profitable lines of business.
Similarly, the field of Corporate Social Responsibility is re-
plete with ambiguity. Recent studies indicate that companies
regularly operate without any consistent, industry-wide vision
of how they ought to interpret and apply the various objectives
that may fall under the CSR subheading.224 Furthermore,
companies tend to focus on and report only their efforts to-
ward compliance with corporate sustainability goals rather
than their actual results.2 25
There is thus significant potential value for international
organizations to authoritatively announce law and adjudicate
223. See Owen C. Pell & Kelly Bonner, Corporate Behavior and Atrocity Preven-
tion: Is Aiding and Abetting Liability the Best Way to Influence Corporate Behavior?,
in RECONSTRUCTING ATROCITY PREVENTION 393, 402 (Sheri P. Rosenberg et
al. eds., 2015) (arguing that "the international legal community has not yet
articulated standards sufficient to impose clear and predictable liability on
corporations for indirect conduct relating to atrocity crimes, let alone im-
pose direct legal liability on corporate directors or officers for failing to su-
pervise subordinates or subsidiaries within conflict zones").
224. See CASEY O'CONNOR & SARAH LABOWITZ, NYU STERN CTR. FOR Bus. &
HUM. RTS., PUTTING THE 'S' IN ESG: MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORM-
ANCE FOR INVESTORS 20, https://staticI.squarespace.com/static/547df270e4
bObal84dfc490e/t/58cad912e58c6274180b58b6/1489688854754/Metrics-
Report-final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9Y4-UEW8] (finding that there is
"no consistent set of standards underpinning 'S' among ESG frameworks");
Florian Berg et al., Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings (MIT
Sloan Sch., Working Paper No. 5822-19, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438533 [https://perma.cc/CS9B-B6D5] (rec-
ognizing that "ESG ratings from different providers disagree substantially").
225. See O'CONNOR & LABOWITZ, supra note 224, at 19 (finding that the
"human rights-focused frameworks were the most likely to be limited to mea-
suring efforts").
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its application. When, for example, the Human Rights Council
announced its list of businesses carrying on operations
deemed to be in unlawful support of a particular state's near
annexation of territory, Airbnb paid attention and sought to
remove itself from that list.22 6 In the garment industry, compa-
nies, unions, state actors, and other stakeholders have formal-
ized their adherence to international law through the Ban-
gladesh Accord.2 27 That agreement provides for factory inspec-
tions, safety monitoring, training, and arbitration in the event
that these pre-judicial processes do not resolve noncompliance
with labor and safety standards to which garment companies
have subscribed.228 In addition, the Hague Rules on Business
and Human Rights Arbitration, launched in December 2019,
are an exciting new initiative offering clearer instruction to
business actors.229 Consenting parties may submit for resolu-
tion existing disagreements involving the human rights im-
pacts of business conduct. Rather than waiting for such a dis-
pute to arise and then getting parties to agree to arbitrate, it
may also be valuable to establish a preclearance process for
international institutional input when a business is unsure if a
particular transaction or operation is compatible with interna-
tional law. This could function in a manner similar to the U.S.
domestic preclearance process for obtaining the President's
approval of mergers with potential national security implica-
tions.230 This is just one possible model for such a process, but
the underlying principle is to make clear whether a company's
contemplated course of action is lawful or unlawful by defer-
ring to a decisionmaker with a greater degree of perceived le-
gitimacy and free from the conflicts of interest the company's
own managers experience. In this way, company leadership
will not be able to so easily exploit the ambiguity of interna-
226. Butler, supra note 11, at 189-90.
227. Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (May 13, 2013),
https://bangladesh.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/
2 0 1 8 /08/ 2 013-Ac-
cord.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM74-HZBB].
228. Id. cl. 5.
229. CTR. FOR INT'L LEGAL COOP., THE HAGUE RULES ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ARBITRATION 1 (2009), https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/ 12/The-Hague-Rules-n-Business-and-Human-Rights-
ArbitrationCILC-digital-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U8E-SDC5].
230. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.§ 4565 (amended 1988).
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tional law to facilitate a course that is contrary to that law's
spirit, even if not explicitly prohibited in its strictest terms.
VI. CONCLUSION
How and why corporations commit to international law
are questions which have so far lacked a coherent and gener-
ally applicable response. This article's primary contribution,
therefore, has been to propose and construct the theory of
corporate opinio juris as a more satisfactory reply.
This article has explained how corporate opinio juris en-
capsulates a company's decision to defer to and follow interna-
tional law, even though that body of rules may not be formally
binding upon it. As the examples highlighted here demon-
strate, corporate opinio juris may be manifested through a
company's actions or abstention from a course of business;
each is a means through which the company may manifest its
commitment to international law to guide its operations. The
article has also proposed that corporate opinio juris is formed
through a varying mix of three fundamental factors: pressure,
strategy, and identity. Finally, this article has sought to offer a
predictive account of when corporate opinio juris might arise
and explain the major implications this overlooked and impor-
tant phenomenon has for international law and corporate be-
havior.
Corporate opinio juris exposes the limited focus of realist
theories and illustrates the expanded compliance pull of inter-
national law on actors that the realists ignore: business entities.
It also illuminates the problems with the realist assertion that a
sense of international legal obligation may only be proved in
instances where actors work against their own interests. Corpo-
rate opinio juris demonstrates that self-interested actors do
sometimes choose law over immediate profit, but that law may
also serve to advance profit in the long term. As such, the
choice between law and profit or self-interest need not be
framed so dichotomously.
Moreover, corporate opinio juris shows how other actors
within the international system, including states and interna-
tional institutions, may harness corporate behavior to advance
international law's commands. As such, corporations may
function as important agents of the international system, but
only if state actors and international institutions with enough
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legitimacy and authority to command the respect of corporate
decisionmakers make clear what international law demands.
Ambiguity, while a boon for the power and sovereignty of
states by providing legitimation to varying courses of conduct,
is the enemy of international law's incisiveness.
This article has begun the work of filling gaps in existing
international legal scholarship to understand the potentially
vast contributions of corporations not merely as lawbreakers
but as law-supporters and to unpack the emerging symbiosis
between international law and corporate participants. The
necessary questions this article addresses have the potential to
lead to coordination on some of the world's most pressing
challenges. But this process of standardization is also open to
corporate manipulation in ways that undermine its objectives
and the fairness of international law as a system of global gov-
ernance. Finding and pursuing the proper balance between
empowering corporations to support and promote interna-
tional law and restraining their more devious activities will be
the work of the field for some time to come.
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